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I. INTRODUCTION
Much ado has been made of the technological advances emerging
out of the digital revolution.1 Now that technology exists to convert all
forms of information-movies, music, newspapers, voice, video-into
digital "software," prognosticators have made great sport of predicting
how quickly our televisions, telephones, VCRs and newspapers will be
replaced by a unified medium through which we can scan the day's news,
order video-on-demand, video conference with friends, balance the
electronic checkbook, place a grocery order, send a few emails, compose a
computer-generated song and, perhaps, publish a sonnet. What many
futurists overlook is that while such a unified medium may provide
consumers with a greater variety of the information they seek at much
greater speed, it also opens up new opportunities for consumers to
receive information they do not seek at much greater speed and in much
greater volume. I refer to the equivalent of junk mail in the unified
medium.
While unwanted commercial solicitations have been a fact of life for
a long time, never before have they threatened the viability of an entire
mode of communication. Because the marginal costs of producing and
distributing electronic junk mail are very low, the incentives for
advertisers to flood the network with unsolicited commercial solicitations
are substantial. Left unchecked, this flood of advertisements could
produce a tragedy of the commons; advertisers, acting in their rational
self-interest, will distribute as many unsolicited advertisements as they
can until most users of the medium find that the effort of sifting through
unwanted solicitations has become too great. At a minimum, this result
would substantially impede communication through the medium.
This article considers the recognized means to avoid the tragedy of
the commons-self-regulation, regulation by market forces, and
government regulation-and concludes that some government regulation
of unsolicited commercial solicitations in a unified medium is likely to be
necessary and will be permissible under the prevailing interpretation of
the First Amendment.
Before proceeding further, the terminology used in this article merits
a short discussion. The object under study is the practice of sending

1. For example, when predicting the benefits made possible by developments in digital
technology, the Commerce Department gushed:
Imagine you had a device that combined a telephone, a TV, a camcorder, and a
personal computer. No matter where you went or what time it was, your
child could see you and talk to you, you could watch a replay of your team's
last game, you could browse the latest additions to the library, or you could
find the best prices in town on groceries, furniture, clothes-whatever you
needed.
Administration Policy Statement, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025, 49,026 (1993).
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unsolicited commercial solicitations; these include the credit card
applications and catalogues you often receive in the mail, the phone call
from the long distance phone company asking you if you want to switch
your service, or the Internet email inquiring about your interest in
purchasing a cassette tape of erotic readings.2 The advertising industry
considers these all to be forms of "direct marketing" because they are
solicitations sent directly from the advertiser to a known universe of
consumers. Direct marketing is distinguished from mass marketing, by
which advertisements are transmitted via mass media to an imprecisely
known universe of consumers.3 This article will not adopt the industry
phrase "direct marketing" because in the eyes of most recipients these
solicitations are better described as junk.4
A more accurate legal
description would be unsolicited commercial solicitations, but repetitious
use of this phrase--or worse, its acronym (UCS)-would be cumbersome
for reader and writer alike. Therefore, for the sake of variety, this article
also uses the terms "junk communications," "unsolicited advertisements"
and "spam"5 to designate unsolicited commercial solicitations sent
directly from advertiser to consumer.
Part II briefly surveys the permissible scope for regulation of
unsolicited commercial solicitations in developed media--door-to-door
6
solicitations, junk mail, junk phone and junk fax. The First Amendment,
as currently interpreted, requires courts to apply intermediate scrutiny to
content-based regulations of commercial speech. Under that test,
complete bans on junk communications through any media have been held
to be unconstitutionally overbroad--except in the case of junk fax. But
restrictions allowing individuals to stop the flow of junk communications
or to limit certain technologies that can be used for unsolicited
communications have been upheld.
Part IMl first reviews current attempts by private parties to regulate
electronic junk mail on the Internet. These attempts have been mostly

2. A recent widespread commercial solicitation on the Internet is an advertisement for
the "Euphoria Tape' which exhorts recipients to "[d]o the Euphoria Tape alone the first
time, and then with a lover. It's a phenomenon you will feel within the first 3 minuteswhat you feel the rest of the time is unbelievable. [The tape is] an audio stimulation of
brain centers controlling pleasure." Rus Coats, Marketers lamming the Internet with Junk
E-mail, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 7, 1996, at 2.
3. Within the industry there is some rivalry between direct marketers and mass
marketers; many in the direct marketing industry blame television advertisers for labeling
direct mail as "junk mail." See, e.g., James R. Rosenfield, Confessions of a Gasp "Junk
Mailer", DIRECT, May 1994, at 82 (pointing out that most television advertising is as much
junk as is direct advertising).
4. See id.
5. This is the term used by Internet inhabitants for electronic junk mail. See infra part
II.A.
6. The First Amendmt to the United States Constitution simply provides: "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press....
U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
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unsuccessful and probably will continue to fail absent some government
regulation. Instead of considering how the government might regulate the
Internet as it is presently constituted, this part anticipates that a new,
unified medium will emerge in which most, if not all, of our
communications will consist of paperless, digital bits of information
moving along an open network and funneled through a single box in our
homes and offices. This part next considers what might happen were
there no regulation of unsolicited solicitations in this medium. Concluding
that unregulated electronic junk mail could substantially impede the
medium's functioning, the part then considers what market responses
might develop to prevent such an outcome. Part Ill concludes with an
assertion that market regulation alone will not sufficiently respond to
unsolicited commercial solicitations, and that some form of government
regulation will be necessary.
Part IV explores whether the principles and doctrine of the law on
junk communications set out in part II can readily support government
regulation of unsolicited commercial solicitations in a unified medium.
This section indicates that some forms of regulation, such as a
requirement that unsolicited commercial solicitations bear a label
identifying them as such, probably would be supportable under existing
First Amendment doctrine. A more difficult issue arises if the government
attempts to ban junk communications altogether.
II.

JUNK COMMUNICATIONS-PRESENT LAW AND
COMMENTARY
In the recent past, advertisers have moved quickly to exploit the
potential of newly developed media to purvey their wares. The ardency
and perceived intrusiveness of such efforts have led to statutory
responses to regulate these sales techniques. Advertisers have challenged
the constitutionality of these statutory responses in court, with mixed
results.
Litigation has arisen with regard to door-to-door sales,7 unsolicited
10
8
mail, unsolicited telephone calls,9 and unsolicited fax transmissions.

7. See Project 80's, Inc. v. City of Pocatello, 942 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1991); Howard

B. Altman, Note, Strangers in the Night: Ordinances Restricting the Hours of Door-to-Door
Solicitation, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 71, 77-78 (1985).
8. See, e.g., Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).

9. See generally Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone Calls and the
Right of Privacy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 99 (1986) (referring to cases, statutes and FCC
regulations on junk phone calls).

10. See Jennifer L. Radner, Comment, Phone, Fax and Frustration: Electronic Commercial
Speech and Nuisance Law, 42 EMORY L.J. 359 (1993).
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Interestingly, many of the issues have been developed in the context of
unsolicited contacts made by attorneys."
With regard to unsolicited commercial solicitations made door-todoor, by mail and by phone, the dominant theme of the litigation has been
to balance the First Amendment rights of the advertisers to speak and
individuals to hear that speech against other individuals' rights to
privacy in their homes. With regard to junk fax, legislatures and courts
have employed a different analysis because most persons affected by
unsolicited fax transmissions have been businesses, whose privacy
interests carry less weight. In the junk fax context, courts have allowed
government regulation because junk faxes use the recipient's paper and
ink (a conversion or unjustified cost-shifting rationale) and the junk fax
transmission precludes other, desired, transmissions from getting through
(a scarcity rationale).
A problem that arises in many of the challenges to content-based
government regulation of unsolicited commercial solicitations is that the
regulations are stated overbroadly, such that they reach unsolicited
religious or political solicitations, which are protected by a stricter
judicial test for legitimacy. While this is likely to remain an issue with
respect to junk communications in a unified medium, the focus of this
article is on regulating those unsolicited communications that are clearly
commercial in nature.
This section briefly discusses the First Amendment test for
government regulation of commercial speech and then reviews how that
test has thus far been applied to government regulation of unsolicited
From this review, I draw some general
commercial solicitations.
principles about the permissible scope of government regulation of junk
communications.
The Central HudsonlFox Test
In 1996, commercial advertisers celebrated the twentieth
anniversary of receiving heightened judicial scrutiny for government
regulation of commercial speech. Until 1976, the Supreme Court adhered
to the rule that while the First Amendment guards against government
A.

11. With regard to unsolicited "snail" mail from attorneys, see Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Assoc., 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Katherine A. Laroe, Comment, Much Ado About Barratry:
State Regulation of Attorney's Targeted Direct-Mail Solicitation, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1513
(1994). With regard to unsolicited electronic mail from attorneys, see generally Michael L.
Winick, et al., Attorney Advertising on the Internet: From Arizona to Texas-Regulating
Speech on the Cyber-Frontier,27 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1487 (1996); Brian G. Gilpin, Note,
Attorney Advertising and Solicitation on the Internet: Complying with Ethics Regulations
and Netiquette, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 697 (1995).
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restriction of speech in most contexts, "the Constitution imposes no12 such
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising."
With the development of our information economy, however, the
Court has come to read the First Amendment to provide broader
protection over the nexus between the marketplace of ideas and the
marketplace for goods and services. Thus, in 1976, the Court invalidated
a state statute barring pharmacists from advertising prescription drug
prices on the ground that the First Amendment protected consumers'
interest in a free flow of commercial information to better assist their
purchasing decisions.13 Some commentators have challenged the distinct
treatment of commercial speech under the First Amendment, 14 but the

Court appears firmly committed to its course.
By 1980, the Court had settled on intermediate scrutiny as the
appropriate standard of review for restrictions on most commercial
speech. Under this test, commercial speech that neither concerns
unlawful activity nor is misleading may be regulated if: (1) the
government asserts a substantial interest in support of its regulation; (2)
the government demonstrates that its restriction on commercial speech
advances that interest; and (3) the regulation is
directly and materially
5
narrowly drawn.'

For a state interest in a regulation to be substantial, the government
must show that the regulation is directed at a "real" harm rather than a
conjectural harm.' 6 To show that a regulation directly and materially
advances the state interest, the government must demonstrate that the
regulation will in fact alleviate the real harm to a material degree.' 7 To be
narrowly drawn, a government regulation does not have to be the least
restrictive means available; rather, there must be a "reasonable fit"
between the government interest and the regulation.18 In determining
whether a fit is reasonable, the presence of "numerous and obvious lessburdensome alternatives" to the restriction is relevant. 9

12. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
13. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 761-70 (1976).
14. See generally Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication,
71 TEX. L. REv. 697 (1993); Alexander Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of
Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990).
15. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-65
(1980); accord Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2375-76 (1995).
16. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993).
17. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1592 (1995) (citing Edenfield, 507 U.S.
at 770-71).
18. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
19. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418 n.13 (1993)
(invalidating city ordinance that selectively banned newsracks belonging to commercial
handbill distributors but not those belonging to newspapers).
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The Test Applied
Interestingly, many of the cases applying the Central Hudson test to
unsolicited mail or phone calls involve ethics regulations limiting
attorneys or other professionals from sending junk mail or making junk
calls.2" However, these cases are of limited value in analyzing the general
principles for permissible government regulation of junk communications
because the state's licensing power gives it an independent interest in
regulating commercial communications by lawyers and other
professionals. This independent interest acts as a thumb on the scale in
the First Amendment balance, leading courts to uphold some regulations
that would probably be impermissible in other contexts.
Nevertheless, sufficient case law exists to tease out the general
principles on which courts rely to assess government regulation of junk
communications. A recurrent issue that will not receive much discussion
here is whether content-based regulations are narrow enough to effectively
disaggregate and regulate only commercial solicitations but not
solicitations by political or religious organizations. The focus of the
discussion is on the courts' analyses once they are satisfied that the
regulation reaches only unsolicited solicitations that are purely
commercial.
B.

1.
DOOR-TO-DOOR
Governmental restrictions on door-to-door solicitation pit the
state's interests in protecting residential privacy and in preventing crime
against advertisers' rights to use an inexpensive avenue of speech. The
First Amendment does not guarantee an absolute right "to enter on the
premises of another and knock on a door for any purpose." 2 ' But while
door-to-door solicitation may be a nuisance to residents and a possible
blind for criminal activity, the Court has asserted that door-to-door
solicitation also is a valuable and inexpensive means for disseminating
ideas.22 To balance the interests of residential privacy and free speech,
the Court has held that state and local governments may not ban door-todoor solicitation altogether,23 but they may impose reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions on all door-to-door solicitations.24 Commercial
solicitations, in theory, are potentially subject to even more burdensome

20. See, e.4., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass n, 436 U.S. 447 (1988).
21. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976).
22. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1943).
23. Id. at 149.
24. E.g., Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Council of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182,
185 (3d Cir. 1984).
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regulation; 2 however, the government also may not ban door-to-door
commercial solicitations altogether.26 Such a ban would treat all
commercial solicitations as trespasses per se, even if some residents may
have welcomed the solicitations. 27 The government may not supplant
private decision making as to whether the solicitations are welcome.
2.
JUNK MAIL
Junk mail has been subject to relatively little governmental
regulation, despite (or perhaps because of) its pervasiveness as a daily
reality. In the sparse case law that does exist, courts have upheld
government regulation that enables individuals to filter junk mail but have
invalidated regulation in which the government filters junk mail.
Junk Mail as Social Phenomenon
a.
The United States Postal Service would have you deny that there is
any such thing as "junk mail."28 Many advertisers in the "direct
marketing" business also would prefer that you speak of unsolicited
commercial solicitations that arrive in your mail slot as "direct mail,"
although some have given up the fight.29 Regardless of the label,
unsolicited commercial solicitations made by mail involve a large part of
the American economy and are a pervasive social reality. Some estimate

25. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-65
(1980).
26. See Project 80's, Inc. v. City of Pocatello, 942 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding,
on remand from Supreme Court, that even under the Fox "reasonable fit" standard, complete
ban on commercial solicitation is unnecessarily broad in furthering the state's interest in
protecting privacy and preventing crime).
27. Id. at 638-39.
28. See Postal Notes, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1996, at A17 (Postal Service advertisement
admonishing the public to respect direct mail and not use phrase "junk mail"). In fact, the
United States Postal Service is aggressively seeking to increase the volume of junk mail sent
by advertisers. See WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1996, at B22 (full-color, full-page advertisement
promoting the benefits to advertisers of "direct mail" over mass media advertising).
29. Compare, e.g., Denison Hatch, An Alternative to "Do Not Mail", TARGET MARKETING,
March 1995, at 80 (exhorting industry colleagues to challenge negative publicity on junk
mail) with Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 82; Phil Herring, Life Beyond the Spreadsheet; the
Future of Direct Marketing, FUND RASING MGMT., January 1992, at 36 (urging direct
marketers to accept term "junk mail" and to respond by better targeting audience so that
unsolicited mail no longer will be considered "junk").
This rhetorical battle seems ill-advised on several levels. First, it is insulting to people
who consider unwanted solicitations to be junk to tell them otherwise. See, e.g., Make Post
Office Recycle Junk Mail, Wis. ST. J., Feb. 17,1996, at 7A (letter to editor) (expressing anger
at Post Office advertising campaign against moniker "junk mail"). Second, attaching or
removing the label "junk' wil not in itself alter consumer behavior. Why, for instance,
have we not seen an analogous campaign waged by Frito-Lay to relabel "junk food" as
"fun food" or some such name? A recipient may occasionally respond to an unsolicited
solicitation but continue to regard the entire class of such communications as "junk."
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that 62 billion pieces of unsolicited mail are sent per year.30 Up to fortyfour percent of these are thrown away unopened and unread. 31 That has
little effect on the practice because some advertisers can make a profit
with only a one percent response rate,32 and most advertisers expect less
than ten percent of junk mail recipients to respond. 3 While increased
costs might reduce the total volume of junk mail, the Postal Rate
Commission recently reduced the cost of sending pre-sorted junk mail by
3.7 percent.34
A large number of Americans consider junk mail to be annoying or
even offensive. 35 Many are willing to pay to avoid it. 36 Additionally,
concern is growing about the harm done to the environment by the
37
resource consumption involved in producing and disposing of junk mail.
This concern remains somewhat diffuse because the environmental groups
most likely to put the concern in focus are themselves junk mailers.3 s
This discontent has led to a governmental regulatory response.
Numerous pieces of legislation have been proposed to regulate junk
mail,39 but because the phenomenon is so pervasive and so many interests
rely on junk mail for revenue, the proposed legislation very rarely becomes
law. Thus, to the extent that junk mail is regulated, it is done so
primarily by forces other than the law.

30. See "Stop the Junk Mail" Kit Soothes Raw Nerve of American Public; Cuts Out
Virtually All Junk Mail While Allowing Wanted Mail to Get Through, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov.
21, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File [hereinafter Stop the Junk Mail];
Michael W. Miller, "Greens" Add to Junk Mail Mountain, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1991, at B1
(putting the figure at 63 billion for 1990).
31. Stop the Junk Mail, supra note 30. Others estimate that only fifteen percent of the
unsolicited pieces of mail were discarded unopened. Miller, supra note 30, atB1.
32. See Herring, supra note 29, at 36.
33. See Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 82 ("Everyone knows that more than 90% of direct
mail turns into literal junk; how many people get response rates of more than 10%,
particularly in mass mailings?").
34. Postal Panel OKs Rate Cut for Junk Mail; Commission Rejects Hike in Price of 1stClass Stamp, CI. TRiB., Jan. 27, 1996, at N1.
35. See, e.g., Stop the Junk Mail, supra note 30.
36. A company marketing a "Stop the Junk Mail" kit that will filter out unwanted mail
received 7,000 calls in its first two weeks in business. Id. Private Citizen, Inc. (1-800-2885865), an Illinois company, sells a service to remove people's names both from junk mail
address lists and national telephone solicitation lists.
37. See CHRIS CALLWELL, 50 SIMPLE THINGS YOU CAN Do TO SAVE THE EARTH (1991)
(best-selling book urging a stop to unwanted junk mail as first suggestion).
38. See Paul N. Bloom, et al., Avoiding Misuse of New Information Technologies: Legal
and Societal Considerations, 58 J. MARKETING 98 (1994) (describing, inter alia,
environmentalists' shift from command "Stop Junk Mail" to "Stop Unwanted Junk Mail" in
CALLWELL, supranote 37).
39. See Hatch, supra note 29, at 80 ("So far some 430 bills have been introduced in
federal and state legislatures to limit ad mail, limit the access to names, the rental of lists
and the perceived, invasion of privacy."); Herring, supra note 29, at 36 ("There are
currently 600 bills at the state and federal level which directly affect direct marketers,
covering telemarketing, privacy and environmental issues.").
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Members of the direct mail industry have responded to public anger
with limited self-regulation: the Direct Marketing Association (DMA) is
the trade association for the industry, and it assists consumers in
removing their names from DMA-member solicitation lists.4" As of 1995,
3.5 million consumers were on the list, which was expanding at a rate of
50,000 per month.4 ' In addition to self-regulation by the industry,
individuals have occasionally found other means to respond to junk mail;
for example, one creative person successfully used state contract law to
strike back.4 2
Another emerging regulatory tactic is attempting to restrict
marketers from buying and selling names, addresses, and other personal
information. In a novel Virginia case, the plaintiff claimed a right under
the state's right-of-publicity statute to be asked for consent before a
marketer traffics in his personal information, and a right to be
In addition, the New Jersey legislature
compensated if it does.4 3
considered a measure that would allow marketers to traffic in the

40. To be removed from unk mail lists, write to: Mail Preference Service, P.O. Box
9008, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735-9008. To be removed from telephone marketing lists, write
to: Telephone Preference Service, P.O. Box 9014, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735-9014. In both
cases, supply full name, variations on one's name, full address and phone number.
41. Hatch, supra note 29, at 80. Approximately 875 million names (including variations
on the same name) have been deleted as of May 1994. Tara Aronson, Fighting Back, S.F.
CHRON., May 25, 1994, at 1Z1.
42. Junk Mail Crusader Wins Battle in Small Claims Court (National Public Radio
broadcast, Feb. 8, 1996) , available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File. A San Diego
software engineer, Robert Beken, bought a book at a Computer City outlet. On the back of
his check he wrote the following contract:
Computer City agrees not to place Robert Beken on any mailing list or send
him any advertisements or mailings. Computer City agrees that breach of this
agreement by Computer City will damage Robert Beken and that these
damages may be pursued in court, further, that these damages for the first
breach are [$1,0001. The deposit of this check for payment is agreement with
these terms and conditions.
Id. Shortly after the store cashed his check, Mr. Beken received a number of advertisements
from the chain. Mr. Beken sued the retailer in San Diego Municipal Court and was
awarded $1,000 plus $21 in court costs. Id.
43. Ram Avrahami filed his suit against U.S. News and World Report for selling his
name and address without obtaining his permission. Paula Squires, Lawsuit Could Force
Direct-MailFirms to Change Tactics, RICHMoND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 4, 1996, at El. Mr.
Avrahami filed the suit in the Arlington Coun General District Court (small claims)
seeking $100 in compensatory damages and $1,200 in punitive damages. Id. The Court
dismissed the suit without prejudice in February 1996 on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. Paula Squires, Junk Mail Suit Unexpectedly
Dismissed, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 1996, at C1. U.S. News filed a parallel
action in the Arlington County Circuit Court (trial court of general jurisdiction) for a
declaration of the legality of its practice of trafficking in names and addresses. The trial in
that case was held on June 6, 1996, the court ruled in favor of U.S. News, and, on September
11, 1996, Mr. Avrahami appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court. Steve Twomey, A Brave
Heart Fights Fiercely For Our Names, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1996, at BI.
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personal information of only those state residents who consented to such
use of their personal information. 4
b.

Junk Mail and the First Amendment

In the few cases involving legal regulation of junk mail, the issue
raised is how to strike the First Amendment balance between a
commercial mailer's interest in speaking and citizens' privacy interest in
controlling the items that enter their homes. As early as 1970, the
Supreme Court took judicial notice of the fact that the average person's
mail is overwhelmingly made up of material she did not seek sent by
persons she does not know.45 Because some citizens find unsolicited junk
mail to be offensive, the Court has held that where a government
regulation grants the citizen the unfettered discretion to refuse to receive
unwanted mail, the regulation is a constitutionally permissible protection
of individual privacy.4 6 This is because "[iun today's complex society we
are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes, but a sufficient
measure of autonomy must survive to permit every householder to
exercise control over unwanted mail."4 7 Thus, when preventing the
receipt of junk mail requires an affirmative act on the part of the citizen,
it is that private act rather than a government edict that frustrates the
commercial mailer's efforts to communicate.48
However, when the government attempts to protect individual
privacy by preventing an entire category of unsolicited commercial
solicitations from being sent through the mail on the ground that the

44. Terry Pristin, New Jersey Daily Briefing; Bill Would Curtail Junk Mail, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 1996, at B1; Ken Liebeskind, NJ Sen. to Propose Opt-in Legislation; Invasion of
Privacy Must End, says Codey, DM NEWS, Jan. 22, 1996, at 1.
45. Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
46. Id. at 736-37 (upholding federal statute allowing recipient unfettered discretion to
request that the Postmaster inform a sender to stop sending any future mailings to that
recipient).
47. Id. at 736.
48. See, e.g., South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935
F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding municipal ordinance precluding real estate agents from
mailing solicitations to homeowners who had indicated a desire not to receive those
solicitations); Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding state statute
with similar real estate prohibition); Baldigo v. Postmaster Gen., 514 F.2d 142 (7th Cir.
1975).
While these cases uniformly recognize the substantiality of an individual's privacy
interest while in her hmme,the privacy interest of a public official in her office is quite
circumscribed. United States Postal Service v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 867
(1986) (holding that Members of Congress cannot use the statute upheld in Rowan to stop
receipt of lewd magazine at their offices because magazine publisher has an independent
right to petition the government, which changes the balance struck in Rowan as applied to
Congressional offices). What is left untested in the junk mail context is the strength of a
business entity's privacy interest in regulating the inflow of junk mail.
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solicitation is offensive, the government violates the First Amendment.4 9
The First Amendment does not permit the government to prohibit speech
as intrusive unless the "captive" audience cannot avoid objectionable
speech.5 ° Recipients of junk mail can avoid offensive speech because the
"'short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can ... is an
acceptable burden... so far as the Constitution is concerned."''
Moreover, there may be some willing junk mail recipients whose interests
in communication also would be frustrated by a government ban on
certain classes of junk mail.
Junk Mail, Attorneys, and the First Amendment
A sub-class of junk mail cases involving solicitations by attorneys
and other professionals also exists. Whether the holdings in these cases
are of more general application is difficult to gauge because the state
asserts two independent interests in regulating solicitations by
protecting the privacy of recipients and regulating
professionals:
professionals licensed by the state. When upholding these regulations,
the courts have not explicitly parsed which interests are being advanced
by the regulation. The trend in these cases appears to be to allow for
greater governmental regulation of solicitations by professionals.5 2
The government may prohibit attorneys from sending unsolicited
mail for a brief period of time when that mail is likely to be a significant
invasion of privacy and when attorneys have available alternative means
of advertising their services.5 3 In addition, because communications from
attorneys have the potential to have a coercive effect, the government
may require attorneys to label their unsolicited commercial solicitations as
5 4
an "Advertisement."
c.

49. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983) (declaring
unconstitutional a federal statute that prohibited unsolicited mailing of advertisements for
contraceptives); cf. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 157 (1946) (invalidating
Postmaster General's procedure by.which it determined postal rates according to whether
publication "contributes to the public good and public welfare").
50. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72.
51. Id. (quoting Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883
(S.D.N.Y.), affid, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968)).
52. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2378-79 (1995) (5-4
decision) (allowing for 30-day post-accident ban on targeted mail by attorneys).
53. See id. at 2381.
54. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206 n.20 (1982) (holding that imposition of
labeling requirement is constitutional); Texans Against Censorship, Inc. v. State bar, 888 F.
Supp. 328 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (upholding attorney disciplinary rues requiring attorneys to
mark unsolicited solicitations made by mail as an "Advertisement" when such mail is likely
inrcipient); Spencer v. Honorable Justices, 579 F. Supp. 880, 890 n.13
) (indicating labeling requirement for unsolicited solicitation by attorney
sufficient protection ofprivacy for ose potentially offended by solicitation); Florida Bar
v. Herrick, 571 So. 2d 1303, 1305-07 (Fa. 1990) (disiplining lawyer who sent letter not
marked "Advertisement"); see also Laroe, supra note 11, at 1549 (1994) (appendix
collecting state laws requiring attorneys to identify solicitations as such).
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The labeling requirement potentially could be applied to all
commercial solicitations. In upholding labeling requirements for attorney
solicitations, the decisions appear to reflect a broader principle that a
government labeling requirement places only a slight burden on the
speaker and the consumer has a strong interest in knowing the nature of a
communication received. In addition, commercial speech is entitled to
intermediate judicial scrutiny only to the extent that the speech is not
misleading.5 5 A government labeling requirement may actually provide
greater protection for the sender by curing what might otherwise be
misleading commercial speech.
d.

Summary

In sum, government regulations that merely assist individuals in
acting affirmatively to stop the inflow of junk mail are permissible
because such regulations simply provide an enabling structure in which
individuals can guard their own privacy against communications they
regard as offensive. In contrast, government regulations that prohibit a
mailer from sending junk mail that the government deems offensive are
impermissible because the government supplants private decisionmaking
with regard to desired communications.5 6 To facilitate private decision
making, the government can require a mailer to label junk mail as an
unsolicited commercial solicitation.
3.

JUNK PHONE

Unsolicited commercial solicitations made by telephone, like junk
mail, have become a pervasive-and many would add, invasive social
reality. The practice grew significantly during the 1980s.-7 By 1990, more
than 30,000 telemarketing firms in the United States, employing more
than 18 million people, generated aggregate sales in excess of $400
billion." One reason for the expansion in junk phone calls has been the
technological development of automatic telephone dialing systems

55. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-65
(1980).
56. Under current First Amendment doctrine, a regulation prohibiting condom
advertisements also could be struck down as a content-based regulation that fails to remain
viewpoint-neutral. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387-90 (1992).
57. Revenues from telephone solicitations increased sixfold from 1982 to 1983.
Telephone Calls from Computers May Be Curbed by Lawmakers, INVESTOR'S DAILY, Aug. 15,
1991, at 25.
58. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In the Matter of Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 10 F.C.C.R. 12391, 12392
(1995) [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion and Order].
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(ATDS). 9 Use of auto-dialing systems greatly reduces the cost of
telemarketing.6 °
Unsolicited telephone solicitations are intrinsically more invasive of
privacy than junk mail. 6 1 A junk call requires an immediate response
because-at least for the time being-there is a cultural expectation that a
person should answer a telephone call at the time it comes in.6 2 Some
also argue that aural communication is inherently more intrusive than
visual communication. 63 The perceived intrusion of a junk call is worse
when the caller is not even a person but a machine.6 4
As with junk mail, telemarketers have engaged in some selfregulation, 6 but this effort has been largely ineffective at stemming public
frustration with junk phone calls.66 Perhaps because the intrusiveness of
junk calls is treated as a legislative fact, 67 government has responded by
regulating junk phone calls far more extensively than it has regulated junk
mail.

59. "The term 'automatic telephone dialing' system means equipment which has the
capacity-(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or
sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers." 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) (1994).
60. For example, an auto-dialing machine with a cost of $1,800 enables the owner to
dial 1,500 telephone numbers per Jay with no more effort than pushing a button. Ann
Marie Arcadi, Note, What About the Lucky Leprechaun?: An Argument Against "The
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991", 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 417, 418 & n.5
(citing interview with manufacturer of automatic telephone dialing systems).
61. Nadel, supra note 9, at 103; Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Lisa Boardman Bumette,
Telemarketing Tug-of-War: Balancing Telephone Information Technology and the First
Amendment with Consumer Protection and Privacy, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029 , 1063 (1992)
("[T]elephone messages received in one's home are more invasive of privacy rights than
mail, television messages, or telephone messages received in the office."); see also Nadel,
supra note 9, at 99 n.6 (summarizing results of a 1978 research report commissioned by
Pacific Telephone Company). In the survey, only 0.1% of respondents "liked" receiving
calls made by sales people, and only 9.1% "did not mind" receiving such calls. Id.
62. As one court has remarked: "A ringing telephone is an imperative, which, in the
minds of many, mustbe obeyed with a prompt answer." People v. Weeks, 591 P.2d 91, 96
(Colo. 1979).
63. Nadel, supra note 9, at 103 n.23 (citing FRANKLYN HAlAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A
FREE SOCIETY 146 (1981)).

64. Congress found that automated calls are "more of a nuisance and a greater invasion
of privacy than calls placed by 'live' persons" because the caller "cannot interact with the
med ways" and these calls "do not allow the caller to feel
customer except in prep
the frustration of the called party.. .. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, S.Rep.
No. 178, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1970; see also
Nadel, supra note 9, at 100 n.7.
65. See supra note 40 (providing address of the Direct Marketing Association's
Telephone Preference Service).
66. For anecdotal evidence of that frustration, see Thomas Petzinger, Jr., They Keep
Workers Motivated to Make Annoying Phone Calls, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1996, at B1
(describing the abuse and rejection faced by those who place junk phone calls).
67. See Telephone Advertising Consumer Rights Act, S.1410, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) (presenting as a finding that "[m]any consumers are outraged over the proliferation
of intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes from telemarketers").
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a.

Federal Regulation

Unsolicited telephone calls have received significant attention from
both federal and state regulators. At the federal level, both Congress and
the Federal Communications Commission have been active in regulating
junk phone calls. The most recent congressional action was the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA).6 8 Congress considered federal
legislation necessary because the ease of interstate calling allowed
telemarketers to circumvent state laws regulating telephone solicitations.6 9
Pursuant to the TCPA, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) engaged in rulemaking to implement the Act.7"
Some of the
a
significant regulations promulgated pursuant to the TCPA include 71
"labeling" requirement by which a telemarketer must identify himself,
time restrictions limiting calls to between 8 a.m. and 9 p.m., 72 and a
provision requiring telemarketers to record and respect do-not-call
requests.7 3 On reconsideration, the FCC has maintained all of these
restrictions.7 4
The TCPA also directed the FCC to explore the possibility of
compiling a national database of those who do not want to receive
unsolicited telephone solicitations. 7 The FCC considered the option but
decided that the costs of compiling and maintaining such a database
would exceed the benefits to the public.7 6
The most far-reaching regulation of junk phone calls in the TCPA is
a prohibition on artificial or prerecorded voice message calls made to
residences without prior express consent.7 7 Congress provided a private
right of action to assist in the enforcement of this provision. 78 The
68. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994)). For
a discussion of the TCPA's legislative history, see Howard E. Berkenblit, Note, Can Those
Telemarketing Machines Keep Calling Me?, The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
After Moser v. FCC, 36 B.C. L. REV. 85, 96-100 (1994).
69. Section 2(7) of Pub. L. No. 102-243 states:
Over half the States now have statutes restricting various uses of the
telephone for marketing, but telemarketers can evade their prohibitions
through interstate operation; therefore, Federal law is needed to control
residential telemarketing practices.
70. See Report and Order, In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752 (1992) [hereinafter Report and
Order].
71. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(2)(iv) (1994) (requiring telemarketer to provide to called
party: (1) the name of caller; (2) name of entity for whom call was placed; and (3) contact
telephone number or address).
72. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(1) (1994) (stating that the hours are as measured by the local
time at the called party's location).
73. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(2)(iii) (1994).
74. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 58.
75. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3).
76. See Report and Order, supranote 70.
77. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(B).
78. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
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breadth of the prohibition on automated calls prompted a swift court
challenge, resulting in the decision in Moser v. Federal Communications
Comm'n [Moser I].79 The Moser I court enjoined the FCC from enforcing
the prohibition on prerecorded message calls to residences on the ground
that the prohibition was a content-based regulation that did not reflect a
reasonable fit between the government's substantial interest in protecting
individual privacy and the means chosen, which still left open the
possibility of auto-dialed message from noncommercial speakers.80
The FCC appealed the decision and won. 81 In Moser II, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the ban on auto-dialing
machines was a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction that
was narrowly tailored and which left abundant alternatives open to
advertisers.8 2 Judge Fletcher, author of the Moser II opinion, read the
statute to be content-neutral because it bans all automated calls,
regardless of content.83 While the statute uses permissive language that
allows the FCC to exempt calls not made for a commercial purpose, 4 this
permissive language alone does not convert the all-encompassing ban into
a content-based prohibition.8"
The Moser II court recognized that choosing to view the statute as a
content-neutral regulation rather than as a content-based regulation of
commercial speech was a distinction without a difference in First
Amendment terms,86 but the Moser II court appears to have made the
distinction to imply that Congress could have banned telemarketing calls
altogether. For authority to uphold the selective ban on automated
telephone calls, the court relied on a series of Supreme Court decisions
holding that underindusive government regulations on speech are
permissible so long as the government's distinction does not amount to
viewpoint discrimination.8 7 The court found the statute to be reasonable
because "Congress may reduce the volume of intrusive telemarketing calls
without completely eliminating the calls."88
Having prefaced this
comment with a review of permissible underindusive regulations, the

79. 826 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ore. 1993), rev'd, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995).
80. Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Moser II].
81. Id. at 971.
82. Id. at 974-75.
83. Id. Interestingly, in Judge Fletcher's opinion in Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC,
46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995), decided five days earlier, she is silent when reviewing the lower
court's opinion which, in dicta, considered the ban on automated calls to be a contentbased regulation. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 844 F. Supp. 632, 638 (D. Or. 1994).
84. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2). The FCC adopted regulations exempting automated calls
made by tax-exempt, non-profit organizations. 47 CF.R. § 64.1200(c)(4) (1995).
85. Moser II, 46 F.3d at 973.
86. See id. (stating that the standard of review in either case is "essentially identical").
87. Id. at 974-75.
88. Id. at 975.

1996

REGULATING JUNK MAIL

court implied that Congress acted reasonably in banning automated calls
because it could have banned all telemarketing calls as unwarranted
invasions of residential privacy.
b.

State Regulation

More than half the states regulate commercial solicitations made by
phone. Forty-one states and the District of Columbia have restricted or
banned intrastate automated commercial calls.8 9 Of the state statutes
prohibiting use of auto-dialing machines, three have been challenged on
constitutional grounds, with mixed results.9" A complete review of the
state law variations is beyond the scope of this article, but state law
remains a relevant consideration because the TCPA explicitly preserves
state regulations that are more restrictive than federal law.9 1 Most states
also have statutes banning telephone harassment that arguably could be
applied to some telemarketing practices. The Supreme Court has passed
on reviewing the constitutionality of these statutes.9 2
c.
Summary
Unsolicited telephone solicitations are a pervasive phenomenon that
simultaneously generates a great deal of revenue and causes a great deal
of frustration. The practice is now regulated primarily by federal law,
which requires that callers fully identify themselves, allow individuals to
opt out of receiving further calls from individual telemarketers, call only
at reasonable times, and not subject recipients to a prerecorded message.
The ban on automated calls is a reasonable restriction because it reduces
the invasion of residential privacy by banning the most intrusive kind of
telemarketing while leaving open abundant alternative channels to
advertisers.
4.
JUNK FAX
Regulations directed against unsolicited commercial solicitations
transmitted by facsimile machines have been the most recent challenges
89. Id. at 972.
90. Compare Lysaght v. New Jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646 (D.N.J. 1993) (invalidating New
Jersey statute banning auto-dialed commercial solicitations as violation of First
Amendment); Moser v. Frohnmayer, 845 P.2d 1284 (Or. 1993) (invalidating Oregon statute
as violation of Oregon Constitution) with State v. Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d 882
(Minn. 1992) (upholding Minnesota statute as consistent wit both state and federal
constitution), cert. denied sub nom. Hall v. Minnesota, 507 U.S. 1006 (1993).
91. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1); Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1547-48 (8th Cir.

1995).
92. See Gorinley v. Director, Connecticut State Dep't of Adult Probation, 449 U.S. 1023,
1023-24 (1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (seeking to review decision
upholding state statute that provides misdemeanor sanctions for persons who have "intent
to harass, annoy or alarm another person" when making a telephone call).
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presented to the courts. Because most communications sent by facsimile
machines are business-to-business, legislatures have justified, and courts
have analyzed, regulations on junk fax slightly differently than those on
advertisements made door-to-door, by mail or by phone. In those cases,
the state interest primarily has been to protect individual privacy in the
home. The law tends to give the privacy interests of business enterprises
less weight than the interests of individuals in their homes, and thus
governments that have regulated junk fax have asserted alternative state
interests in regulation. The two leading interests are to provide freedom
from conversion of paper and ink and to protect against preclusion of a
desired communication by an unsolicited fax solicitation. 3
a.

Federal Regulation

As with junk phone, junk fax has been subjected to federal
regulation by Congress and the FCC and to extensive state regulation. On
the federal level, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
(TCPA), in addition to regulating junk phone, prohibits altogether
unsolicited fax solicitations containing advertisements.9 4 Predictably, the
ban has been challenged in court, and, somewhat surprisingly, the ban has
been upheld.95
In Destination Ventures, the Ninth Circuit held that the government
has a substantial interest in preventing the shift of advertising costs from
sender to recipient-here the relevant costs are paper and toner-and in
preventing unsolicited advertisements from precluding receipt of desired
communications. The court concluded that the interest in preventing costshifting is directly advanced by a total ban on fax advertisements and the
ban is a reasonable fit with the interest; the government is not required to
adopt less restrictive regulations such as time or page restrictions on
unsolicited fax advertisements. 96 By using an underinclusion rationale
similar to that in her Moser II opinion, Judge Fletcher found that Congress
could reasonably choose to ban unsolicited fax advertising without
addressing other unsolicited fax transmissions such as those with
political messages since junk faxes impose the bulk of the cost-shifting
problem. 97 Interestingly, the court was not swayed by the plaintiff's
evidence that there soon may be technological solutions to avoid the "real
harm" of cost-shifting.98
93. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56 (9th Cir. 1995).
94. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).

95. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d 54.
96. Id. at 56-57.
reasoning.

See infra text accompanying notes 187-91 for a critique of this

97. Id. at 56.
98. Id. at 57 ("The possibility of future technological advances allowing simultaneous
transmission and eliminating the need for paper does not alter this conclusion. We look at
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State Regulation
b.
States began regulating junk fax transmissions in 1989. 9 Currently,
eighteen states have passed statutes regulating junk fax transmissions.' °
The TCPA leaves in place those state regulations that are more restrictive
than the federal law, 10 and impliedly preempts less restrictive measures.
Some state legislatures continue to consider junk fax legislation, 10 2 but it
appears that the most the states can add is stiffer penalties for violating
the federal ban.
Summary
c.
Advertising by junk fax was a fast-growing practice until Congress
banned it altogether in 1991. The fax context gives rise to a new principle
when unsolicited
for the regulation of junk communications:
advertisements shift advertising costs from sender to recipient, the
government may ban that mode of advertising altogether, even when less
restrictive regulatory alternatives are available.

the problem as it existed when Congress enacted the statute, rather than speculate upon
what solutions may turn up in the future.").
99. Connecticut was the first state to pass a junk fax law. See Michael M. Parker, Fax
Pas: Stopping the Junk Fax Mail Bandwagon, 71 OR. L. REV. 457, 462 & n.22 (1992).
The story behind passage of Connecticut's law is ironic. After passage by the
legislature, Governor William O'Neill was uncertain about signing the legislation. Id. He
was persuaded to sign the bill after receiving by fax hundreds of letters opposing the
legislation. Id. Receipt of these faxes had tied up his office's machine and had precluded
receipt of time-sensitive information from the state's Office of Emergency Management on
possible flooding. Id. The Governor stated that being subjected to a lobbying campaign by
fax had "brought home" the need for junk fax legislation. Id.
Interestingly, signing the bill could not constitutionally do anything to alleviate the
problems created by the fax lobbying campaign. The law reached advertising by fax and
thus-as a restriction on commercial speech--could survive intermediate judicial scrutiny.
The statute is silent with respect to lobbying, which is political speech situated at the core of
the First Amendment's protective reach. Any prohibition on lobbying by fax would have to
survive strict judicial scrutiny, a burden the state would not likely be able to meet.
100. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-570c (West 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 365.1657
(West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-5-25, 46-1-1(3) (Harrison 1990); ILL ANN. STAT.
ch. 720, para. 26-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); MD. COM. LAW II CODE ANN. § 14-1313
(Michie 1990); McH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1771-.1776 (West Supp. 1992); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 86-1209 (1987 & Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.325 (Supp. 1991); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 396-aa (McKinney Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1862-1863 (West
Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.872, 646.608(ff), 646.632, 646.638, 646.642 (1991); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 11-35-27 (Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-75-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-1601 to -04 (Supp. 1991); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 35.47 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-25a-101 to -107 (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-40.2 (Michie 1992); W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-139 (1992).
101. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1).
102. See Assembly Bill Would Stop Unwanted Faxes, CAPrTAL, Feb. 5, 1996, at Al
(discussing bill introduced in Maryland assembly to regulate junk fax).
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C.

The Principles For Government Regulation of Junk
Communications
By reviewing the application of intermediate judicial scrutiny to
regulations on unsolicited advertisements in a variety of media, certain
basic First Amendment principles emerge. The First Amendment requires
that a government restriction on commercial speech must directly advance
a substantial government interest by means that are reasonably fitted to
the interest. 10 3 The government has a substantial interest in regulating
junk communications to protect residential privacy and to prevent the
shifting of advertising costs from sender to receiver.
Regulations that enable individuals to choose not to receive
unsolicited advertisements are reasonable,' but the government may not
supplant that private choice with a decision that an entire mode of
-ommunication should be foreclosed'0 5 or engage in content
discrimination by banning unsolicited advertisements that the government
deems to be offensive. 10 6 However, when Congress finds that use of a
technology for advertising is particularly intrusive on residential privacy,
and when recipients have no effective means of opting out of receipt of
such intrusive communications, Congress may supplant private choice
and ban advertising by those means so long as advertisers have
alternative avenues open to them.'0 7 Congress also may supplant private
choice and ban altogether a mode of advertising when that advertising
necessarily shifts advertising costs from sender to recipient.' 8
I1. ELECTRONIC JUNK MAIL-PRESENT AND FUTURE
The analysis in this part is presented in two steps. First, it surveys
the current state of regulation of commercial solicitations on the Internet
because the future unified medium is likely to evolve out of the Internet.
This regulation is almost entirely private and not particularly effective.
The survey demonstrates the weaknesses of arguments that a unified
medium can be regulated entirely without government intervention.
Second, this part envisions that a unified medium is emerging in which
most, if not all, of our communications consists of digitized information
funneled through a single receiving unit in our homes and offices. The
purpose of envisioning the emergence of a unified medium is to facilitate

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
Project 80's, Inc. v. City of Pocatello, 942 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1991).
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,75 (1983).
Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 1995).
Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56 (9th Cir. 1995).
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discussion in part III about how the principles set out in part I might be
applied to unsolicited commercial solicitations in such a medium.

A.

Junk Mail on the Internet: Enter the Spammers

In the brave new world of digital communication, unsolicited
solicitations made via electronic mail are increasing at an exponential
rate. As with many aspects of online life, electronic junk mail has a code
name: spam. 0 9 As more and more people begin to use and rely on the
Internet, 10 the scale and importance of the 8pam problem increases.'
Many who follow the expansion of the Internet and media convergence
recognize that unregulated electronic junk mail has the potential to
overwhelm the network.1 12 Others recognize the potential problems of
electronic junk mail but express confidence that technological solutions
will reduce these problems to no more than a minor nuisance.' 13 This
latter view could be overly optimistic.
This subsection briefly describes current attempts to privately
regulate sparn on the Internet. Concluding that these efforts alone cannot
stem the rising tide of unwanted commercial solicitations made by
electronic mail, this subsection then describes the constitutional issues
that might arise should the government attempt to regulate electronic junk
mail. Because these issues are likely to evolve as the medium develops,
as discussed in part II.B., a full analysis of them is deferred to part III.

109. Spam is both a noun describing electronic junk mail messages and a verb describing
the act of indiscriminately sending electronic junk mail messages; one who sends electronic
junk mail is known as a spammer. One electronic junk mailer, who dubs himself "Spain
King," claims to send three to four electronic mass mailings per day. Daniel Akst, Postcard
From Cyberspace, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1995, at D4.
110. According to one estimate, as many as 50 million people around the world have a t
least begun to use the Internet. Ste hen McGookin, An Uncertain Feeling About the Internet,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995, at IX (book review section). In the United States, a recent
survey places the number of homes with Internet access at 14.7 million. See Jared Sandberg,
U.S. Households With Internet Access Doubled to 14.7 Million in Past Year, WALL ST. J., Oct.
21, 1996, at B1i. The same survey found that nearly nine million adults access the World
Wide Web daily. Id.
111. See, e.g., Coats, supra note 2, at D2; Jeff Pelline, Junk Mail Proliferating on Internet;
Boon for Advertisers, But Users Fret About Privacy, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2, 1995, at Al; John
Schwartz, It's the Spain You Read That's Making Many Interneters Queasy, WASH. POST,
Nov. 20, 1995, at FI
112. The problem was recognized early in the development of electronic mail. See John
Seaman, Is ElectronicJunk Mail Good for Users?, COMPUTER DECISIONS, June 1, 1983, at 74
(discussing the problem of frivolous electronic mail on internal corporate computer
networks). However, the need for a solution is only now becoming more urgent. Because
electronic addresses are easy to identify and the costs of overhead for electronic
advertisin, are minimal, "[t]he Internet could literally be buried in a flurry of electronic
junk mail.' Linda Himelstein, Law and Order in Cyberspace?, Bus. WK., Dec. 4, 1995, at 44
(quoting Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center).
113. "[A]ssuming that the relatively petty irritations and junk mail can be worked out,
the advent of commerce on the network only underscores a larger question: Who, precisely,
is going to control this new Internet?" Waldrop M. Mitchell, Culture Shock on the
Networks, 265 SCIENCE 5174, 879.
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1.
PRIVATE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC JUNK MAIL
Private regulation of electronic junk mail on the Internet has
Currently, private
developed with incredsed use of the medium.
regulation consists of: (1) "cultural" regulation by customary law; (2)
vigilante regulation by those who track down and spain the spammers;
(3) structural regulation by the policies of online service providers; and
(4) market regulation by those who buy and sell information filters to
screen out spam. Each form of regulation deters some spanming, but,
taken as a whole, these methods are unlikely to sufficiently restrict
spamming so that the Internet can continue to function.
a.
Cultural Regulation: The Role of Netiquette
The Internet initially was developed as a means of linking defenserelated scientific researchers across the world." 4 The small, relatively
homogenous community of Internet users developed certain norms for
communicating on the new medium. Over time, these norms-now
subsumed under the rubric "netiquette"-provide guidance for members
of the online culture."' Although original participants celebrated the lack
of formal regulation on the Intemet-often likening it to a new frontier, a
Wild West-these same participants often were quite orthodox in their
this orthodoxy has given
enforcement of the informal norms, and
6
netiquette the weight of customary law."
As the number of Internet users has mushroomed, online culture and
the customary law on the Internet are in a period of rapid, contentious
development." 7 Battles over electronic junk mail capture aspects of this
culture clash." 8 A general netiquette principle is that one's
communications should not waste other people's time.11 9 A second

114. See Richard Zaitlen & David Victor, The New Internet Domain Name Guidelines:
Still Winner-Take-All, 13 No. 5 COMPUTER LAW. 12, 13 (1996) (providing a succinct
description of the Internet's development).
115. Many online service providers now post a statement of recommended online
etiquette. A very general statement of some of the norms can be found in FAQs (Frequently
Asked Questions),TIME, July 25, 1994, at 50 [hereinafter FAQs].
116. See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757,
1758-59 & nn.6-7 (1995) (describing norms and constraints of communication by electronic
mail as "a form of customary law, determining how and when people communicate with one
another"); see generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WrrHOuT LAW (1991) (describing
how cultural norms can operate like legal constraints in absence of formal law).
117. Mitchell, supra note 113, at 879.
118. As discussed supra part 1.2.a, the cultural norm in the physical world is to temper a
strong distaste for paper junk mail with an acceptance of junk mail as an inevitable reality.
Attempts by newcomers to extend this norm to cyberspace have been resisted by the early
inhabitants of cyberspace, who cling to the competing norm of treating the Internet as a
commercial-free zone.
119. This principle is reflected in rules on keeping communications succinct and to the
point; rules on sticking to the subject of a discussion group; and a prohibition on needless
communications concurring with statements by others. FAQs, supra note 115, at 50.
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principle has been that the Internet is a non-commercial forum.1 2 ° This
latter principle has waned with the rise of commercial online service
providers, but remnants remain. These two principles are brought
together in the netiquette rule against unsolicited advertisements sent by
electronic mail.1 2 '
While breaches of the netiquette prohibition on spamming continue
122
to increase, the prohibition still acts as a constraint on some marketers.
For now, the netiquette prohibition increases the cost of spamming by
increasing the risk that a spammer will receive a negative return on his
investment. Even if one percent of the spam recipients purchase the
spammer's goods or services, there is a real chance that the spam will
drive away otherwise potential
customers among the remaining ninety123
nine percent of recipients.
This constraint, however, is limited. The online culture is in the
midst of rapid transformation. While some newcomers are likely to
adopt current netiquette norms, many others are likely to bring the norms
that govern our physical spaces into cyberspace. One of these norms may
be an acceptance of junk mail as an inevitable nuisance. If all marketers
engage in spamming, the risk of a negative return will decrease because
consumers will not blame Sears for spamming them when they also
receive spain from J.C. Penney, Macy's and all the other department
stores.
b.

Vigilante Regulation

One aspect of the informal nature of netiquette as a set of norms
governing the medium is that no formal processes presently exist for
enforcing these norms. For those new members of the Internet community
who are not deterred from spamming by the opprobrium of breaching
netiquette norms, another consideration that may deter some spamming is
the presence of online vigilantes who enforce the netiquette norm against
124
sending electronic junk mail.

120. See Mitchell, supra note 114, at 879.
121. See id. ("[T]he unwritten rules... tell users not to waste other people's time with
irrelevant electronic chatter-and especially, not to sully the network with self-serving
advertisements and junk mail.").
122. See, e.g., Kristen Baird, Local Net Providers Feud Over Netiquette, CRAIN'S CLEV.
Bus., June 12, 1995, at 3 (quoting local junk mailer who publicly, apologized for spanning
but also said, "We realize this is a big cultural issue ...[b]ut I think we would consider
another bulk e-mail if we felt it was appropriate."); Rosalind Resnick, Tread Lightly on the
Internet, HOME OFF.COMPUTING, Apri- 994, at 80 (advising marketers to be judicious when
choosing targets for junk mail).
123. See infra part III.A.2 on spammer blacklists.
124. See Steven Carlson, How To Keep "Spam" From Clogging E-mail, BUDAPEST Bus. J.,
Dec. 4, 1995, at 30 (referring to one online vigilante who is dedicated to thwarting the
efforts of the "Spain King," see supra note 110).
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Generally, the techniques vigilantes use to enforce the norm are:
attempting to deny a spammer continued access to the Internet; putting
the spammer on a blacklist; "flaming" the spammer (i.e., inundating his
mailbox with hostile mail);125 and using utility programs known as
Cancelbots that automatically delete multiple postings to online
discussion groups. 1 26 If the vigilantes cannot identify the spammer, they
may seek to exact vengeance on the service provider that allowed the
spain to get through.

27

Vigilante justice generally is a troubling form of regulation because
results are unpredictable and often appear more arbitrary than the results
under a more formal system. For example, one marketing company
claims that it was wrongly blacklisted, and those who have posted the
blacklist have not provided a contact number or a process for getting off
the list.1 28 Vigilante regulation, then, is not likely to provide a systemic

solution to the problem of unsolicited electronic junk mail, and there may
be a backlash against the vigilantes if their actions produce arbitrary
enforcement.
c.
Structural Regulation
Currently, the vast majority of Internet users access the network
through intermediaries: internet service providers (ISPs). To the extent
that the service agreements under which ISPs provide access have the
agreements act as a form of structural
same or similar terms, those
29
regulation for the network.

125. See id. With "exquisite chutzpah," a company used spam to sell potential
vigilantes an antidote to spam--The Spammer Slammer-a program that enables potential
vigilantes to generate thousands of messages to be sent to the source of undesired email.
Thomas Petzinger, Jr., A Morality Tale From the Wild World of the Internet, WALL ST. J., Nov.
1, 1996, at B1.
126. See Carlson, supra note 124, at 30.
127. Cynthia Flash, A Breach of "Netiquette"; Junk E-mail Outrages Computer Users,
NEws TRm., Jan. 7, 1996, at Al (describing vigilante attacks on one small-scale Internet
service provider because it failed to stop spammer from spamming members).
128. Jean Heller, Junk Mail Creates Computer Headache, ST. PErERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 2,
1996, at Al (describing a company blacklisted for allegedly marketing a T-shirt that it
never made).
129. Commentators have recognized the increasing prevalence of structural regulation
by contract, and they are split on its desirability. Compare Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps
in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 311, 321 (1995):
But this new law of the Internet would be unlike any form of legislation
known to modem society. No one elected its drafters or the Internet
providers who adopted it. They are accountable to no one.... Nor is there
any provision for 'opting out" of this new social contract, other than by
It would be a sheer accident if the model
withdrawing from cyerspace ....
code drafted (presumably)by the Internet providers themselves... happened
to be the optimal means of regulating behavior in cyberspace.
with David R. Johnson & Kevin A. Marks, 38 VILL. L. REV. 487, 515 (1993):

1996

REGULATING JUNK MAIL

Because both senders and recipients of electronic junk mail gain
access to the Internet through ISPs, ISPs can regulate spain at both its
origin and destination. To regulate spain at its origin, numerous ISPs,
including those who operate proprietary networks that are also linked to
the Internet, include terms that make it a violation of the service
agreements to send electronic junk mail. 3 ° To regulate spam at its
destination, ISPs can attempt to filter out the junk in their subscribers'
incoming electronic mail. America Online, the largest commercial online
service, recently began to filter subscribers' incoming mail by bouncing
certain junk mail back to the sender, and, at 31
the time of this writing,
litigation is ongoing with respect to that policy.
One commentator advances the view that America Online should be
allowed to take this action and that ISPs should be allowed to use
contract as a kind of marketplace for the law of the Internet. 3 2 However,
this form of structural regulation of spam probably is of limited utility for
practical, market and legal reasons. The practical constraints are that
identifying the source of electronic junk mail is often difficult, 133 and junk
mailers can themselves become ISPs. Spammers have incentives to
disguise the origin of their mass mailings-to avoid being flamed among
Cyberspace is, and should be, ruled mostly by contract. The highest duty of
any sysop [system operator] is to be thoughtful and truthful regarding
applicable ground rules.... The best policy, from a social perspective, is to let
the new medium develop free of the shackles imposed by any particular, soonto-be outmoded, legal metaphor.
130. E.g., No Spamming for MCI Under New Policy, INVESTOR'S DAILY, Jan. 23, 1996, at
A8 (quoting MCI official, "We reserve the right to automatically disconnect and deny
access to any MCI customer who violates this spamming policy....').
131. America Online (AOL) adopted its filtering policy in response to subscriber
complaints about the increase in spain received, amounting to 15 million pieces each week.
See Jared Sandberg, America Online Sets Cyberspace Barriers Against Junk E-mail, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 5, 1996, at B4 (reporting that AOL's view is that even with this policy "the
government may have to intervene with regulations"). Even before adopting its policy,
AOL was sued by Cyber Promotions, a Philadelphia junk mailing company, for tortious
interference with contract. Trial is set for November 1996. 1 , The head of Cyber
Promotions, Sanford Wallace, is also known as the "Spain King." Jana Sanchez-Klein,
Meet the most HATED MAN on the INTERNET, BALTIMORE SUN, May 28, 1996, at 1D; see
supra note 111.
Almost immediately after the filtering policy went into effect, Cyber Promotions, which
sends one to two mass mailings a day to 1.3 million Internet addresses, 75% of which are at
aol.com, filed a separate suit against AOL. See David S. Hilzenrath, AOL Ordered to Stop
Blocking Junk E-mail, WAsH. Posr, Sept. 7, 1996, at D1. The plaintiff won a preliminary
injunction against the AOL policy in U.S. district court in Philadelphia. Id. But the Third
Circuit swiftly reversed the rulin . Thomas E. Weber, America Online Wins Rounds in
Suits Over Junk E-mail and Billing Practices,WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1996, at B6.
132. See David Post, The Case of Virtual Junk Mail, AM. LAw., Nov. 1996, at 97, 98
("But if many Internet service providers implement a similar prohibition [against sending
electronic junk mail], and if those service providers flourish and attract many
subscribers.., who has the right to say... that that isn't the best rule to deal with this
problem?").
133. It is difficult but not impossible. See Tim Blangger, You Can Shut Off Unsolicited
E-mail, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Feb. 6, 1996, at D1 (describing process for
identifying source of electronic mail message).
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other reasons. As of this writing, litigation is in process over a leading
spammer's practice of designating a different reply address than the
originating address to avoid flames and the return of undeliverable
messages.

134

The market reason is that some of the -larger service providers take
an equivocal position toward spam. On the one hand, the service
agreements of most major providers make it a breach of the agreement to
spain other members. 35 On the other hand, these same providers can
profiles to spamrnmers 136 or from
and do profit from selling subscriber
137
spamming their own subscribers.

The legal reason is that, even if the providers decided to crack down
1 38
on spammers, to do so effectively they would have to act in concert,
and such action could raise antitrust problems. Regulation of electronic
junk mail by online service providers is therefore not likely to stem the
rising tide of spam.
Market Regulation: Information Filters
d.
A number of people put great stock in the use of information filters
to solve the problem of electronic junk mail. This article argues below
that such hope is overly optimistic, but filters can unquestionably reduce
the reach of spam. 139 Filters simply delete or reroute messages that fit a
certain profile. So long as a user can accurately describe those messages
that she wishes to delete-whether described by sender, by subject or
otherwise-the filter can eliminate a great deal of electronic clutter. The
134. Concentric Network Corp. v. Wallace, No. 96-CV-20829 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 2,
1996). Defendant Sanford Wallace, head of Cyber Promotions, Inc., agreed to cease the
behavior in response to the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order. 1
Electronic Info. Pol'y & L. Rep. (BNA) 672 (Oct. 18, 1996). The plaintiff is an Internet
service provider. In addition to claiming that Cyber Promotions had violated the terms of
its service agreement, the plaintiff also claimed violations of three federal statutes-the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), and the Lanham Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1125(a)-as well
as a number of common law tort causes of action. Id. at 673-74.
135. See FIN. POST, October 26, 1996, at C12.
136. See Stephen Lynch, Junk Mail Heads Your Way Online, NEW ORLEANS TIMESPICAYUNE, Jan. 13, 1996, at C1. Three of the largest service providers-Compuserve,
Prodigy and America Online-sell the personal data of all subscribers who have not
expressly indicated that they do not want their data sold. Id.
137. America Online "is no stranger to direct marketing: It bombards members with its
own online sales pitches while the meter is ticking...." Hilzenrath, supranote 131, at D2.
138. First, there would have to be an industry-wide agreement to include in all ISP
service agreements a term prohibiting spamming. Otherwise, those ISPs that allow
spamming would become magnets for electronic junk mailers. Second, some form of
coordinated enforcement would be necessary, such as a blacklist of all those who have had
their access terminated for violation of the spamming prohibition. Otherwise, spammers
could simply open an account with a different ISP if their current account were terminated.
139. See Brett Glass, Server With Internet Link Will Help You Filter Unwanted Mail,
INFOWORLD, Dec. 18, 1995, at 41 (describing one successful method of filtering); Diana
Hwang, App to Help VARs Curb Net Mail, COMPUTER RESELLER NEws, Feb. 5, 1996, at 24.
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problem is that spammers can disguise the nature of their message to
circumvent most filters.
Each of the four aspects of private regulation on the Internet deter
some spamming, but the costs imposed on spammers are fairly low in
comparison to the potential benefits from spamming. Assuming rational
action, we should expect spamming to become an increasingly common
practice. We might reasonably expect to see some government regulation
in response. As a historical matter, government at either the local, state
and/or federal level has acted to regulate every other form of commercial
solicitation. 4 ° As a practical matter, spanming potentially could become
so pervasive that, left unregulated by government, it could drive people
away from the network altogether.
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF UNSOLICITED
ELECTRONIC JUNK MAIL
Private regulation alone will not be able to stop electronic junk mail
from overwhelming or impeding the functioning of the emerging
information network. Therefore, some form of government regulation will
be necessary. Already, the federal government has begun to contemplate
regulation of electronic junk mail on the Internet. 4 ' This subsection
briefly describes an argument that Congress already has banned electronic
junk mail, and then-concluding that the argument is unpersuasiveconsiders the constitutional issues likely to arise if the government
engages in more explicit regulation of electronic junk mail.
2.

Has Congress Already Banned Spamming?
Arguably, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
(TCPA)-by its ban on sending unsolicited advertisements to a
"telephone facsimile machine"-already makes illegal the sending of
electronic junk mail. This textual argument has some surface appeal. It
could potentially take care of the whole spamming problem without any
new enactments.
The TCPA makes it unlawful for any person within the United
States "to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device
to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile
a.

140. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
141. For example, the Federal Trade Commission devoted one of a series of hearings on
regulating unfair business practices on the Internet to the junk mail problem. November 20,
1995. In addition, the Clinton Administration has advised providers of telecommunications
services to get consumers' permission before using or selling information about their
customers. See Regulators/Regulations: Recommendations for Telecom Privacy, DoT.COM,
Nov. 1, 1995 (citing a Commerce Department report providing "recommendations" to the
industry). Should te industry ignore the Administration's advice, formal regulations may
follow. Id.
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machine."' 4 2 Thus, the focus is on the receiving device; to violate the
TCPA, a spammer using a computer must simply send an "unsolicited
advertisement" to a "telephone facsimile machine." An "unsolicited
advertisement" is broadly defined as "any material advertising the
commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services
which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express
invitation or permission.".143 The TCPA defines a "telephone facsimile
machine" as:
[E]quipment which has the capacity (A) to transcribe text or
images, or both, from paper into an electronic signal and to transmit
that signal over a regular telephone line, or (B) to transcribe text or
signal received over a regular
images (or both) from an electronic
1 44
telephone line onto paper.
Relying on the text of the statute, one could argue that a spanmer
violates the law when he sends an unsolicited advertisement from his
computer over regular telephone lines to another computer via the
Internet. That other computer is "equipment which has the capacity" to
take the electronic signal and transcribe it onto paper-anyone can print
their email. Further support for this reading can be found in the FCC
interpretation of the TCPA to mean that a "telephone facsimile machine"
includes fax/modems attached to a computer. 45 The fax/modem is a
device capable of receiving an electronic signal sent either as an image file
(fax) or a text file (electronic mail). In either case, the fax/modem makes
it possible for the signal to be transcribed onto paper.
As appealing as this argument may be to those who wish to make
spamming illegal, it presents a problem. If the government were to rely on
this textual argument to apply the TCPA to spanming on the Internet, a
court likely would find that application to violate the First Amendment.
Most of the elements that persuaded the Ninth Circuit to uphold the ban
fax machines are not present in the context of
as applied to conventional
14
junk mail on the Internet. 1
In the fax context, the government persuaded the court that the ban
was reasonably fitted to the government's interest in preventing unfair
cost-shifting and preclusion of desired communications by unsolicited
advertisements. 4 7 Neither of these harms are equally presented by
unsolicited electronic mail.

142. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added).

143. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4).
144. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2).
145. Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 58, at 12405-06.
146. See Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on
district court's use of legislative history and fact that junk fax universally involves unfair
cost-shifting to uphold TCPA's ban on unsolicited fax advertising), aff'g 844 F. Supp. 632
(D. Or. 1994).
147. Id.
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There may be some cost-shifting for those who subscribe to
commercial online services and who pay by the minute-these people pay
for the time it takes to delete and/or download the junk mail. But many
others have Internet access for which they pay a flat rate, which means
that they incur no marginal cost in dollars and cents for the time it takes
to throw out the spam.
Arguing that spain precludes other electronic mail messages is even
more difficult. At present, the scale of the problem has not reached the
level at which the network's electronic memory has been filled to capacity
with electronic junk mail. Generally, electronic mail messages do not go
undelivered because the addressee's box is overflowing with spam. The
best argument for why message-preclusion is as big a problem with
electronic junk mail as it is with fax solicitations is that in both cases
what is precluded is timely receipt of a desired communication.
In the fax context, if a business does not receive a desired
communication because junk faxes are tying up the line, that
communication may eventually get through, but the business will have
been precluded from receiving the message in a timely fashion. Similarly,
with electronic junk mail, a business has not effectively "received" a
desired communication until it is identified. If someone in the business
has to scroll through and delete large amounts of electronic junk mail on a
daily basis, that junk mail is precluding the business from effectively
receiving its desired communications in a timely fashion.
This argument is problematic because it proposes a more subjective
standard for preclusion. In the fax context, an unsolicited advertisement
precludes a desired communication from reaching the recipient's
"premises" at the time the fax is sent because the two machines cannot
connect. In the electronic mail context, a desired communication reaches
the recipient's "premises" to the same extent that all other electronic mail
messages do because the two machines, via the network, connect.
To withstand intermediate scrutiny, the government must assert a
substantial interest in imposing the regulation, and the regulation must
alleviate a real harm. 148 The government interest in avoiding message
preclusion is probably in preventing desired communications from being
precluded from reaching the recipient's premises. This would be the case
because the government risks its claim to a "substantial" interest in
preventing message-preclusion if that interest is defined in the vague
terms of preventing only the "untimely receipt" of desired
communications. If preventing preclusion from the premises is the
government interest, then that interest is present in the ban on unsolicited
faxes but not present if the ban is applied to electronic junk mail. Thus,

148. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993).
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governments probably cannot enforce the TCPA as a ban on electronic
junk mail.' 4 9 The government may be able to ban electronic junk mail, but
specific findings and potentially a different rationale may be necessary
for such a ban to be constitutionally permissible.
Through the Looking Glass-the Future and the Box
This article seeks to explore the regulatory possibilities for junk
communications that may be present in a unified medium and to argue
that the government should have greater latitude to regulate these
communications than has been the case in some of the other junk
communications contexts.
This analysis proceeds on the basis of two assumptions: that most
communications will be digitized and sent through a unified medium, and
that the structure of that medium will be a network with an open
"Open architecture" refers to a decentralized network
architecture. 5
structure, analogous to the telephone system, within which
communications can take a number of paths to reach their destination. In
this structure there is no single network operator and no single
concentrated distribution point-as there is in a typical cable television
system-over which a network operator can exercise private control to
restrict communications. An additional assumption is that abundant
memory capacity for electronic communications and sufficiently
abundant channels of communication will be present so that there is no
reasonable argument that the medium suffers from a "scarcity" problem
that would provide the basis for content-based government regulation
analogous to that in the broadcasting area."'
While this exercise requires a degree of speculation, some recent
developments provide a basis for imagining how communication may
take place in a unified medium. Evidence suggests that the Internet,
B.

149. See Michael D. McConathy, Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC and Moser v. FCC.:
How Much Should the Telephone Consumer Protection Act Restrict Your Phone, Fax and
Computer?, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 153, 180-81 (1996) (implicitly concluding that
TCPA does not ban solicitation by electronic mail).
150. See generally Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control:
Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104
YALE L.J 1619 (1995) (discussing advantages of open architecture in promoting First
Amendment goals of viewpoint diversity and increased user control).
151. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court adopted a scarcity
rationale to uphold the FCC's fairness doctrine-content-based regulation of political
speech by broadcasters. 395 U.S. 367, 386-89, 400-01 (1969). With respect to other, less
scarce media, application of a functional equivalent of the fairness doctrine was held
unconstitutional. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The Court
has recognized criticism of the Red Lion decision, but for the moment it continues to read the
First Amendment to mean that the scarcity of the broadcast nedium entitles the government
to more extensive regulation. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 114
S. Ct. 2445, 2456-57 (1994).
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particularly the World Wide Web, is beginning to take on attributes that
may bring it closer to television as a medium of communication.15 2 For
example, some content providers have begun to assign "channels" for
15 3
their information and to package it in the form of "shows."
But because information on the Internet currently travels point-topoint rather than over the airwaves or via satellite signal, some content
providers are exploring ways to exploit that attribute of the medium to
send customized information to users in what are essentially
At the same time, other companies have
personalized broadcasts.5
developed a means of using radio frequencies designated by the FCC for
personal communication services (PCS) to send customized information
from designated Web sites to computers equipped with an appropriate
receiver.' 5 While these developments demonstrate how consumers can
increasingly use a computer as a kind of television, other developments
15 6
allow the use of a television as a computer connected to the Internet.
In light of these developments, we can fairly assume that instead of
our recognized categories of communication-such as mass media,
community newsletters, private mail-we will have a continuum of
communications on the network, with familiar aspects at both ends of the
spectrum. In terms of private communications, we will probably have
one-on-one audio-visual conversations, protected by the same degree of
privacy enjoyed by those who currently still use wireline telephones. At
the mass media end, live video coverage of major events will continue to

152. See Bart Ziegler & Jared Sandberg, AOL Wants to Be Viewed Like a Cable-TV
Company, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 1996, at B4 (describing a new corporate strategy that would
allow America Online to compete more effectively as an Internet service provider); see also
G. Christian Hill, U.S. West Media, Microsoft Buy VDOnet Stake, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1996,
at A11B (describing investment in company that has developed technology "that squeezes
video and voice over the narrow pipes of the Internet and its graphical-layer, the World
Wide Web").
153. See Don Clark, Microsoft Unveils an Online Overhaul With TV-Style Structure on
Network, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1996, at B5 (describing television-like attributes of Microsoft
Network).
154. Software now on the market allows users to describe categories of information
that they wish to have transmitted to, or retrieved by, their computers from specific Web
sites at regular intervals. Jared Sandberg & Don Clark, Two Start-Up Firms Unveil
Software to 'Push' Information on the Internet, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1996, at B9 (describing
software that not only sends updated information to computers but to pagers as well).
155. See Walter S. Mossberg, Now Even Home PCs Can Get Web News, Data
Automatically, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1996, at B1 (describing two products that provide this
service and their respective limitations, including limited ability to customize the filters for
incoming information).
156. See Patrick M. Reilly, New WebTV Has Sony, Philips Racing to Snatch Holiday
Sales, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1996, at B8 (describing efforts to market a new, relatively
inexpensive device that allows navigation of the World Wide Web with a remote control
and a television set); Walter S. Mossberg, Now You Can Watch Another New TV Show, But
It's No Sitcom, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1996, at B1 (describing the new technology and
reporting on how it differs from navigating the Web with a personal computer).

264

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 11:2

exist, which millions of viewers may simultaneously access.5 7 But in
between, one can imagine the presence of a great deal more variety. For
example, the category of an "unsolicited" commercial solicitation may
become contentious as people5 8can increasingly customize the information
they receive via the medium.'
Small electronic discussion groups among friends may come to
In these groups, members may put on
include strangers.
"performances," 15 9 and they may begin to charge for access to these
Alternatively, members may include product
performances.
endorsements or other advertising in their performances in exchange for
money, which may be necessary for the production of the
performances. 160 Mass media presentations also may be less uniform.
The current model of particular shows or newspapers being sent to our
homes at particular times could be inverted. Rather than being sent into
to2
our homes by producers, information might be made available for us 16
retrieve at our leisure.1 61 Assume that standardized, "mass-produced"
157. Presentations of events that we may want to observe as they happen may be the
last vestige of mass media as we know it because, as a general rule, we will no longer
consume our cultural products on a uniform timetable. One person may choose to survey
the news at 9:26 pa. while another waits until 10:34 px Some may want to skip the
sports and lifestyle stories while others may only want the sports and weather. With
video-on-demand, consumers will be able to watch movies and entertainment programs on
their own schedule. This may mean that we are not watching exactly the same movies or
shows. See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of "modular"
programming.
158. A number of companies already are marketing "mass customized" advertising for
the Internet. See Amy N. Lipton & Jennifer S. Taub, Real World Examples of Successful
Electronic Commerce, 452 PLI/PAT 405, 416-17 (1996) (citing examples).
Non-entertainment
159. The range of these presentations is virtually limitless.
performances might include such things as an opinion piece on an issue of public
importance. This piece might be presented in text, in video, or in some combination thereof.
Entertainment performances could include a multiplayer video game, a music/video/text
performance of original composition, or a music/video/text compilation of existing
compositions.
For example, imagine a group of friends who share an interest in popular music. As
time has goneby, other music lovers have joined the group. To enjoy their favorite music
better, group members compose multimedia presentations to accompany their favorite songs.
These multimedia presentations consist of compilations of new and old scanned images,
movies, and text.
160. In the music video example, see supra note 142, a group member may need to pay for
intellectual property rights to compile such a performance.
161. How important the directionality of communication will be to the scope of
permissible overnment regulation remains unclear. Communications that are perceived to
radiate out into people's private" spheres may be subject to greater regulation on the
ground that the communicator's speech rights have to be balanced against the recipient's
privacy rights. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (allowing
regulation of indecent broadcasting on ground that pervasiveness of redium reduces
parents' ability to guard against minor hearing indecent programming). Some cases appear
to disregard the importance of directionality. "Pervasiveness" may simply mean readily
available. See Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 873 (9th Cir. 1991)
(upholding parents' right to block access to "1-900" telephone numbers).
162. This phrase will likely come to mean "produced for a mass audience." Rather than
the provider sending a broadcast signal in numerous directions, the program itself will be
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entertainment and non-entertainment "programs"' 63 will continue to be
available. Because we are the ones accessing the program, it need not be
the same program for each of us.
Producers of standardized entertainment and non-entertainment
programs might engage in "modular" programming. Under this form of
production, a program would be composed of standardized modules that
could be assembled differently according to consumer preferences. For
example, when choosing to view a movie, viewers may be able to select
the rated version they want, with additional scenes of sex and violence
added in progressing from the G-rated version to the X-rated version. We
may even get a choice of plot structure.16 4 Assuming that some degree of
modular programming comes into being, 16 advertisers may be better able
to target their audiences. 66
Under this scenario, the advertisements we receive will depend on
the modules we have selected; the distinction between mass media
advertising and junk mail will break down.
Rather than selling
advertising space directly to specific advertisers, programmers may
simply sell blocks of space to advertising syndicates.
Because
programming will not be entirely standard and because the time
constraints of fitting the program into a particular "time slot" will not
exist, the limits on how much advertising can be attached to programming
will be determined by the mix of government and market regulation that
emerges in the unified medium. That is, will consumers be deemed to
have consented to receive any and all advertisements attached to
programming, such that they have no recourse but to not buy programs
that include advertisements for, say, guns or sexual aids? Or might the

capable of being copied millions of times in a very short period and will be available for
retrieval by consumers.
163. What nomenclature will develop for clips of information in the unified ni1im
remains to be seen. Here a "program" could be a video entertainment show, but it also
could be the newspaper, a cokbook, etc.
164. For example, viewers could choose between a happy and sad ending or between
light and dark comedy.
165. This does not seem to be such an outlandish assumption. Movies and television
shows already are filmed scene-by-scene with no regard to sequence. So long as the
marginal cost of producing additional scenes is less than the marginal revenue produced by
giving consumers their choice of version, we would expect to see modular programming.
166. This assumes that advertising will still be attached to programming.
All
programming might instead be financed on a pay-per-view basis, but the incentives for
programmers to sell advertising space in their programs are likely to be greater than the
benefits of providing commercial-free programming.
An unscientific survey of 409 online users, conducted by a marketing magazine,
provides some further support for the proposition that people would accept advertising in
exchange for lower costs in receiving programs. Online Users Survey Results: Electronic
Junk Mail-No; Bribes-Maybe, INTERAcTIVE FAcrs, June 6, 1994. The survey found that only
28% of respondents thought junk mail should be allowed on commercial online services, but
54% would accept junk mail in their boxes in exchange for free online hours or other
financial incentive or rebate. Id.
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government have a role in regulating the types and amount of advertising
that can be attached to programs?
C.

Private Regulation in the Unified Medium
1.

THE NEED FOR REGULATION: A TRAGEDY OF THE
COMMONS
One might imagine how the unified medium would operate absent
government regulation of unsolicited solicitations on the network. From
an advertiser's perspective, the incentives to send junk mail early and
often would probably be great. Evidence indicates that even if only one
percent of junk mail and junk phone recipients purchase the advertiser's
product or service, the advertiser generates more revenue than the
advertisements cost him. 67 If these are the numbers when a junk mailer
has to spend, say, ten cents per mailing, what is to stop an advertiser
when the marginal cost of sending a piece of electronic junk mail is
virtually zero?
Given the incentives for advertisers, we should expect that the
network would be flooded with unsolicited commercial solicitations. 1 68 If

this comes to pass, the worst-case scenario would be a tragedy of the
69
commons in which the entire network would be rendered useless.
Everyone's receiver would be so full of unwanted solicitations that the
effort needed to sift the useful from the useless would be far too great to
make the effort worthwhile. To avoid the tragedy of the commons, some
form of regulation is needed. This could be self-regulation by advertisers,
market regulation by other participants in the market, and/or government
regulation. Under our constitutional scheme, which places limits on the
scope of government regulation of commercial speech but which places no

167. See Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 82.
168. See Himelstein, supra note 112, at 44 (discussing concerns over junk mail glut on
Internet).
169. A "tragedy of the commons" occurs when users of a aon
asset or public good
act in their rational self-interest to derive as many personal benefits as possible from the
asset-a process that results in the depletion of the asset, leaving all involved in a worse
position han they would have been had use of the asset been regulated to preserve it. See
generally Garrett Hardin, A Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). In this
case, the tragedy would arise because advertisers' returns on junk mailing would drop so
low that even with the minimal marginal costs, no net value will be derived forn the
advertising efforts.
In the popular press, discussions of junk mail on the Internet occasionally reference the
problem of the commons. Referring to the Spam King, one article placed this junk mailer's
activities in the "great American tradition of profit from abuse of the commons." Akst,
supra note 109, at D4; see also Howard Rheingold, Selfish Interests Spoil the Net, DENVER
PoST, Jan. 27, 1995, at 23 (describing junk mail as tragedy of the commons analogous to
overgrazing of land).
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limits on private regulation, our cultural preference appears to be in favor
of private regulation.
Although there is some precedent for self-regulation by advertisers,
the motivation for that regulation appears to be to preempt government
regulation rather than to preserve the commons. 70 If the threat of
government regulation were neutralized, we probably would not see
effective self-regulation by advertisers.
INFORMATION FILTERS ALONE ARE NOT THE
SOLUTION
The market regulation most commonly anticipated is production of
information filters that will either screen out or sort junk
communications.171 Information filters can be classed generally as "optout" filters or "opt-in" filters, with the distinction deriving from the
default position of the user. With an opt-out filter, the user will receive
all communications until she opts out of receiving selected
communications;' 72 with an opt-in filter, the user will receive no
communications until the she opts in to receiving certain
communications. 73 Opt-in filters could be "restrictive" opt-in filters
through which users opt to receive the communications of identified
parties, or they can be "broad" opt-in filters through which users opt to
receive certain classes of information.
2.

170. For example, in June 1996, the direct marketing community announced proposed
self-regulation in response to a workshop on consumer privacy conducted by the Federal
Trade Commissionr Lipton & Taub, supra note 158, at 424-25. The Direct Marketing
Association and the Interactive Services Association issued joint statements on "Principles
for Unsolicited Marketing E-mail" and a "Draft Online Notice and Opt-Out Principle." Id.
at 447-48 (providing full text of both statements). Arguably, then, self-regulation in the face
of potential government regulation is actually effective. In the first document, the industry
agreed to the "principle" that "[o]nline solicitations should be clearly identified as
solicitations and should disclose the marketer's identity." Id. at 447. But query whether
the industry would so readily agree if an enforcement mechanism were in place.
171. See, e.g., Joanne Pransky, Robots: Our Future Information Intermediaries, INFO.
TECH. & LIBR., Dec. 1995, at 257 (describing need for and availability of information filters
to "manage e-mail, handle phone calls, anyread and organize your junk mail.").
172. For example, the statute at issue in Rowan provides individuals with an opt-out
filter for junk mailby allowing them to inform the Postmaster not to deliver materials sent
by selected mailers. Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 730 (1970).
Similarly, regulations promulgated pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
provide individuals with an opt-out filter by requiring callers to maintain lists of those
who have requested that they not be called again. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(2)(iii) (1995).
173. An unlisted telephone number is effectively an opt-in filter. A person with an
unlisted number will receive no telephone calls-except for calls generated by random digit
dialing and misdialed calls-until that person gives her telephone number to people she
selects. Some evidence suggests that people choose to have unlisted phone numbers
precisely to filter out junk phone calls. See Nadel, supra note 9, at 100 & n.13 ("Many of
the estimated 13.9% of consumers with unlisted telephone numbers [1981-82 figures] may
have sought that refuge to protect themselves from [unsolicited junk] calls.").
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Information filters would thus reduce the threat of junk mail
mucking up the system so badly that it grinds to a halt. Users of opt-out
filters presumably could set them either to exclude junk mail altogether or
to shunt the junk mail to a holding place where it may or may not be read.
Users of opt-in filters would get no unsolicited commercial solicitations
unless they either gave their addresses to certain mailers-in which case
the mail is not "unsolicited"-or if the primary recipients of their
addresses intentionally or unintentionally passed them on to advertisers.
For either type of filter to work effectively, communications need to
be accurately labeled. To enable someone to opt-out of junk mail without
opting out of desired communications, the filter must reliably be able to
distinguish the two categories. This is less an issue with restrictive opt-in
filters, but if one uses a broad opt-in filter to receive certain classes of
communications, accurate labeling is equally important.
If accurate labeling is not possible, only restrictive opt-in filters may
make the medium work. But if this limited opt-in filter is the norm, a
number of the advantages of the medium are foregone. Not only will each
user have to designate affirmatively all the entities from whom she wishes
to receive communications, but she also will not receive unsolicited but
desired communications. Moreover, were use of this type of filter the
norm, people would need to remain cautious about revealing their
addresses. This caution might curtail participation in online discussion
groups or any other public communication that would result in disclosure
of one's electronic address to strangers. Since this result is undesirable
and the only alternative is effective opt-out filtering, accurate labeling of
junk mail will be important for the medium to fulfill its potential.
Moreover, for opt-out filters and broadly calibrated opt-in filters to
work, accurate labeling is required. Why should an advertiser label his
communication as an unsolicited commercial solicitation when the likely
result is that it will get filtered out by numerous recipients? Why not
circumvent the filter by mislabeling the advertisement as a desired or
important communication?'
Assuming that this is the likely response of
most advertisers, how can the market alone regulate mislabeled
advertisements? It simply cannot.
Thus, some form of government regulation in addition to market
regulation through filters will be necessary to stop junk mailers from
constipating the network. The three most likely forms of regulation the
government might consider would be a labeling requirement, restrictions
on commerce in personal information, and a complete ban on unsolicited
electronic advertising. If the government is able to force advertisers to

174. This certainly is the current practice among numerous (paper) junk mailers. All of
us commonly find mail advertisements masquerading as prize announcements, checks,
governmental communications (brown paper), etc.
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label their solicitations accurately, filters should work to avoid the
tragedy of the commons. Further, if the government can restrict the ability
of businesses to sell customer profiles to advertisers, junk mailers will
have less information with which to identify their targets. 7 A total ban
on unsolicited electronic solicitations is obviously the most forceful means
to regulate electronic junk mail. If these forms of government regulation
will they be
become desirable or necessary, the question arises:
constitutionally permissible?
REGULATING UNSOLICITED ADVERTISEMENTS ON
THE BOX
The analysis in part II yielded the conclusion that some government
regulation will be necessary to avert the tragedy of the commons which
will result if advertisers so fill the medium with junk communications that
its utility substantially declines. The aim of this section is to apply the
First Amendment principles derived in part I to three principal types of
potential government regulation.
Before taking this step, we must ask whether the principles from
part I are likely to remain good law in the future. Will our understanding
of the First Amendment be changed by our communicative efforts in a
unified medium? Influential constitutional scholars who have thought
about the issue conclude that First Amendment principles should not be
viewed as technology-specific, and therefore the challenge will be
applying the tried-and-true principles in new contexts. 176 A number of
First Amendment scholars have begun to think about how these principles
1 77
might be applied to speech communicated through the emerging media.
Most commentators assert that, so long as the new medium has an
"open" architecture, the dominant feature of the new medium will be
IV.

175. Such a regulation may actually exacerbate the junk mail problem, because greater
information enables advertisers to limit their "mailing" to those who would have some
likelihood of responding positively. Without that information and with low marginal
costs, advertisers will resort to the blunderbuss approach and send their messages to
everyone.
176. See generally Sunstein, supra note 117; Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in
Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the Electronic Frontier, Keynote Address at the
First Conference on Computers, Freedom & Privacy (Mar. 26, 1991) (transcript available at
http: / /www.cpsr.org/dox/conferences/cfp9l/tribe.html).
177. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 117; M. Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action:
Cyberspatial Settings and the First Amendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1681 (1995); Fred H. Cate, The
First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure,30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1
(1995); Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy and
Confidence in the Network, 30 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 105 (1995); David J. Goldstone, The
Public Forum Doctrine in the Age of the Information Superhighway (Where Are the Public
Forums on the Information Superhighway?), 46 HASTINGS L.J. 335 (1995).
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greater individual control over sending and receiving speech. 178 There is
some suggestion that greater individual control may impact the rules for
regulating "mass media," but there is little suggestion that that control
will necessitate alteration of the principles for regulating unsolicited
commercial solicitations. Therefore, this analysis will proceed on the
assumption that the part I principles remain the relevant analytic
framework.
The three types of regulation that I consider most likely are: (1) a
labeling requirement for unsolicited advertisements so that individuals
can use their information filters effectively; (2) restrictions on commercial
use of personal information; and (3) a complete prohibition on unsolicited
electronic advertisements.
If It's Junk, Put a Label On It
In part II, the analysis indicated that unwanted commercial
solicitations could be effectively controlled through the use of information
filters. But to work effectively, information filters require accurate
identifying marks on communications to enable effective discrimination
Since those sending
between desired and undesired information.
unsolicited advertisements will have strong incentives to disguise the
nature of their communications, the coercive force of a government
labeling requirement is necessary for information filters to be used
effectively.
The First Amendment places limitations on the government's ability
to require that labels be put on unsolicited commercial solicitations. The
requirement could be viewed as either a content-based requirement
applied only to commercial solicitations or as a content-neutral time,
place, and manner restriction on all unsolicited solicitations; in either case
the First Amendment analysis is virtually identical.'79 The government
will have to demonstrate a substantial interest that is directly advanced
A.

178. See generally Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control:
Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104
YALE L.. 1619 (1995).

179. In the commercial speech context, whether a regulation is content-based or is a
content-neutral time, place and manner restriction has little functional impact because the
constitutional test is the same. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 477 (1989).
For an analysis of a labeling requirement for violent television shows via a ratings
system, see Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89
Nw. U. L. REV. 1487 (1995) (discussing the likely collapse of the cable/broadcast
distinction for First Amendnt purposes and the permissible range for government
regulation of violent programming, including use of the V-chip).
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by a labeling requirement, and the fit180between the interest and the scope
of the regulation must be reasonable.
A labeling requirement for unsolicited commercial advertisements
would probably be upheld as a constitutional regulation. To ensure such
a result, the government should assert three independent substantial
interests in regulating-protecting individual privacy, preventing unfair
cost-shifting, and preserving the viability of the medium. The reason that
the government should assert all three interests is that none of these
interests alone is neatly transferred from other contexts to the unified
medium. The government should then demonstrate how a labeling
requirement reasonably advances these interests.
1.

PRIVACY IN THE HOME

The primary government interest in regulation of door-to-door sales,
unsolicited mail and unsolicited phone calls is the protection of
individual privacy in the home. 8 ' The well-settled substantiality of this
interest is evidenced by the Supreme Court's predilection for rhetorical
flourish when describing it. 18 2 As strong as the state's interest is,
however, the government may employ only limited means to protect
The
against intrusions by unsolicited commercial solicitations.
government may regulate to provide an enabling structure for individuals
to protect their own privacy but may not shift the locus of
the government itself is banning certain classes
decisionmaking such that
83
of junk communication.
In seeking to impose a labeling requirement for unsolicited
solicitations in the unified medium, the government could argue that such
a regulation is a reasonable fit with privacy protection because the locus
of decisionmaking remains with the individual who chooses whether or
not to filter out the labeled communications. The government could also
point to current state law, which requires attorneys to label their
solicitations as an "Advertisement" to ameliorate the potentially coercive
effects of attorney communications and to protect privacy in the home.'8 4
But would a labeling requirement for unsolicited advertisements in
medium really be protecting privacy in the home? Unlike a
unified
the
180. See supra part I.A. (discussing Central Hudson/Fox test for commercial speech
regulation).
181. See supra parts L.A-C.
182. For example, in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980), the Court asserted that
"[tihe State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is
certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society," and in 'Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988), the Court stated that "a special benefit of the privacy all citizens
enjoy within their own walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to
avoid intrusions."
183. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983).
184. See supra part I.B.2.c.
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knock at the door or a ring on the phone, nothing is similarly disruptive
and intrusive about receipt of an electronic message. Whether a
government-enforced labeling requirement, which enables effective
filtering, is sufficiently analogous to the statute upheld in Rowan, which
enabled individuals to filter out offensive junk mail, remains to be seen.
Such an analogy may be problematic depending on how we conceive of
the "place" to which electronic messages are sent.
If the electronic mailbox is merely a part of our home, which is
entitled to the fullest protection of privacy, then the analogy may be a
snug fit. But if our electronic mailbox is a more public space than the
physical mail slot entering our home, the government's interest in
protecting privacy in that more public space will be diminished. As one
writer has described it:
A home in the real world is, among other things, a way of keeping
the world out.... It's like being inoculated with a little bit of the

world, which makes you better able to survive the whole world.
hole you drill in a
An online home, on the other hand, is a little
wall of your real home to let the world in.' 85
How the concept of "privacy" will be constructed for cyberspace is
a topic that has attracted a great deal of attention.186 A full exploration
of the privacy issue is beyond the scope of this article. It is sufficient to
recognize that the government may not be able to rely on its interest in
protecting residential privacy to justify regulation of electronic junk mail.
Therefore, other potential state interests must be explored.
COST-SHIFTING
2.
Whether a labeling requirement would be upheld as preventing
unfair cost-shifting would probably depend on how the unified medium is
financed. If a significant number of users of the unified medium are
charged for their use by the amount of time they spend, then a labeling
requirement avoids unfair cost-shifting by allowing users to automatically
filter out unwanted advertisements without having to spend time and
money deleting these advertisements individually. 187 If prevention of
cost-shifting is an interest that is reasonably advanced by the greater step

185. John Seabrook, Home on the Net, NEW YORKER, Oct. 16, 1995, at 66 (describing the
author's experience in designing his Home Page on the World Wide Web).
186. See, e.g., Goldstone, supra note 177; Reidenberg & Gamet-Pol, supra note 177; see

also Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of
Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989 (1995).
187. In the current environment, Internet service providers appear to be moving away
from time-based access charges. "America Online, bowing to the inevitable, is expected to
announce today that it will offer customers flat-fee pricing for unlimited access to the
Internet in a bid to stay competitive with the fast-moving industry." Jared Sandberg,
America Online To Unvei Flat Fee for Internet Access, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1996, at B5.
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of prohibiting all unsolicited fax advertisements, 188 then that interest is
reasonably advanced by the lesser step of allowing such communications
so long as they are accurately labeled. 9
If the government sought to use this argument in support of a
labeling requirement, it should do so cautiously because the reasoning for
why prevention of cost-shifting is such a strong state interest or why a
complete ban is reasonably fitted to that interest remains somewhat
elusive. Neither Congress nor the courts have thus far considered it
necessary to articulate precisely where the substance in the interest lies.
The First Amendment merely requires that the state demonstrate that the
harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate those
harms to a material degree. 9 ° Thus far, the courts have accepted as
evidence of real harm unchallenged testimony before Congress that junk
fax forces unwilling recipients to pay for paper and ink and to forgo
receipt of other transmissions while the unsolicited transmission is
received.1 9 '
"Cost-shifting" cannot mean general cost imposition because every
form of junk communication imposes some costs on recipients, 19 2 but the
government cannot reasonably ban door-to-door sales or other junk
communications in order to avoid those costs. On the one hand, a ban
based on a cost-shifting rationale may mean that when junk
communications impose objectively quantifiable costs on recipients, the
state has a stronger interest in protecting recipients from unwillingly
spending money on behalf of advertisers rather than from spending time
for the benefit of advertisers.
On the other hand, the focus may be on situations in which
advertisers shift costs from themselves to recipients. The time cost
imposed on recipients of other forms of junk communication is not a cost
the advertiser would otherwise bear. But presumably, the cost of paper
and ink are costs an advertiser would bear but for the existence of fax
technology that allows the advertiser to shift those costs to recipients. If

188. See Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding
statutory ban on unsolicited fax advertising as permissible regulation).
189. This greater-includes-the-lesser justification for regulation of speech has its limits.
Government may regulate underinclusively so long as that regulation does not amount to
viewpoint discrimination or content discrimination. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387
(1992). A labeling requirement remains viewpoint-neutral because all commercial speech
would be subject to such labeling.
190. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993).
191. See Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 844 F. Supp. 632, 635-37 (D. Or. 1994)
(citing liberally from congressional hearings in support of the TCPA), affid, 46 F.3d 54 (9th
Cir. 1995) (stating that parties concede substantiality of state interest in preventing costshifting).
192. These costs are, for example, the time it takes to sort through junk mail or listen to a
telephone solicitor. Additionally, psychic costs are also imp(sed, such as the frustration
caused by receipt of unwanted solicitations.
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it is this shifting that is the key aspect of the cost-shifting rationale, the
derived principle may be that when an advertiser can use a technology to
shift costs that the advertiser otherwise would bear to the recipient, the
government may reasonably correct that market failure by prohibiting the
advertiser from using the technology altogether to make unsolicited
solicitations.
PRESERVING THE VIABILITY OF THE MEDIUM
The last interest that the government should assert in favor of a
labeling requirement is in maintaining the viability of a unified medium.
All of the potential benefits of a unified medium, induding increased
productivity due to the ease of telecommuting and the enhancement of
information-sharing and increased consumer choice with respect to
educational and entertainment programming, 1 93 are lost if the medium is
rendered useless by the tragedy of the commons. So long as the
government can assert that the tragedy of the commons is a "real harm"
that reasonably is avoided by a labeling requirement for unsolicited
electronic advertisements, then this would be a separate interest not
available to the government in other contexts. While ample evidence
already exists that junk mail on the Internet frustrates many online
inhabitants,1 94 how close we must come to the tragedy of the commons
before a court will consider the threat posed by unsolicited
advertisements on the unified medium to be a "real harm" remains to be
seen. In other contexts, courts have expressed skepticism over the
government's claimed interest in structural regulation. 195
Taken as a whole, the interests in protecting privacy in the home,
preventing unfair cost-shifting, and preserving the viability of the medium
appear to be fairly substantial even though none are neatly transferred
from other contexts to the unified medium.
3.

ALTERNATIVES FOR REGULATORS AND ADVERTISERS
In addition to asserting its interest in a labeling requirement, the
government also must persuade a court that the requirement is reasonable
given the regulatory alternatives and that the requirement leaves open
alternative means for advertisers to communicate. The government does
4.

193. See supra note 1.
194. See supra part II.A.
195. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D.
Va. 1993) (declaring unconstitutional the cross-ownership ban on telephone companies'
owninmg video programmers (47 U.S.C. § 533(b)) because such "structural" economic
regulation still disproportionately impacts entities engaged in protected speech), aff'd, 42
F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated, 116 S.Ct. 1036 (1996) (remanded to Fourth Circuit on
question of mootness).
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not have to use the least burdensome regulation available,'9 6 but the
presence of numerous, less burdensome alternatives raises doubts about
the reasonableness of the regulation. 9 7
A labeling requirement would place a modest burden on commercial
speakers. If the medium has become so pervasive that other alternatives
for unlabelled solicitations such as paper junk mail are no longer viable,
then the requirement effectively requires all in-bound communications to
be labeled. The material costs for placing a label on the communication
would be de minimus, and the label helps consumers better obtain the
commercial information they want, which is the First Amendment value
that justified heightened protection for commercial speech in the first
instance.
In addition, advertisers can also communicate with consumers by
maintaining "places" in the unified medium where consumers come to
them. As with a home page on the World Wide Web, advertisers will be
able to post information about their goods and services to a site on the
medium. 198 When consumers seek information by entering a search
command into their computer, the advertiser's information-if it fits
within the consumer's search parameters-may then reach the consumer.
In such a situation, the information travels into a consumer's home not as
an unsolicited advertisement but as a solicited communication.
Furthermore, a labeling requirement appears to be one of the least
restrictive alternatives available to the government. It would simply
require that an advertiser identify in a header or in some other
standardized format which could easily be read by the receiving device
that the enclosed communication is an unsolicited commercial solicitation.
Presumably, the advertiser would have the option to add additional
descriptions of the contents-for example, "catalogue enclosed"-so long
as those descriptions are not misleading. A labeling requirement is merely
an enabling provision that allows private individuals to filter their
communications. The requirement by itself does nothing to impede the
flow of unsolicited advertisements. Therefore, a labeling requirement
would be reasonably fitted to the government's interests in protecting
individual privacy, preventing unfair cost-shifting and preserving the
viability of the medium.

196. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
197. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417-18 (1993)
(invalidating city ordinance as impermissible underinclusive regulation of commercial
speech because it banned from the public streets only newsracks belonging to commercial
handbill distributors but not newsracks belonging to newspapers).
198. Advertising via Web pages appears to be increasing. Bart Ziegler, NetCount Seeks
to Tally Users of Web Ads, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1996, at B17.
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Restricting the Sale of Personal Information
Perhaps the government could regulate unsolicited commercial
solicitations indirectly. The government could regulate the sale of
personal information in a number of ways; for example, it could grant
individuals a property right in their personal information or directly
regulate the sale of such information.199 Granting such a right might create
transaction costs that vastly outweigh the benefits.20 °
Quite possibly, a provision restricting the sale of personal
information such as a person's address, phone number or email address
has no First Amendment implications. What is being regulated is the sale,
which under most analyses would be conduct rather than speech. A
number of privacy advocates support such a restriction, and at least one
state legislature recently considered such a provision.2 0
The government could also directly regulate the sale of personal
information. A First Amendment issue might arise if such a regulation
places a heavy burden on or effectively precludes communication by
commercial speakers. But advertisers are unlikely to have the basis for
such a claim. Assuming that some form of telephone directory will be
available in the unified medium, 20 2 advertisers would find it difficult to
argue that privacy restrictions precluded their ability to speak when such
a directory would provide the means to address a large audience. This
section simply points out that the government has another indirect means
of regulating unsolicited advertisements by increasing the costs of
information gathering for marketers through prevention of the sale of
marketing lists.
B.

Can the Government Declare the Unified Medium a JunkFree Zone?
A more difficult question arises if the government determines that,
as a matter of public policy, the unified medium should be free from
unsolicited advertisements. Under existing principles and precedents, the
government cannot support such a ban as a means of protecting privacy
C.

199. Note that courts have not yet been willing to grant such a property right in
personal information. See supra note 43 (discussing suit by Virginia man asserting
property right in personal data under state right-of-publicity statute).
200. One commentator concludes that recognition of a property right in personal
information would not be a solution because, although it would shift some costs to
advertisers by requiring them to pay for the right to send junk mail, it would shift
significantly greater transaction costs to consumers. See A. Michael Froomkin, Flood
Control on the Information Ocean: Living With Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed
Databases,15 J.L. & CoM. 395, 492-93 (1996).
201. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
202. Already, some versions of Web browsers like Netscape Navigator include access
to the "Internet White Pages." In addition, users can visit http://www.fourll.com
(Four1l) or http://www.wiowhere.com (WhoWhere) to find Internet addresses.
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in the home. Protecting privacy is not a sufficient justification for the
government to place a complete ban on offensive commercial
solicitations20 3 or a complete ban on an entire mode of communication,
such as door-to-door sales, to be used for commercial solicitations.2 " 4
Under current principles and precedents, the government may
apparently ban this form of communication only if necessary to avoid
unfair cost-shifting or as a reasonable time, place and manner restriction.
This subsection considers whether either of these arguments would be
likely to succeed in justifying such a ban on the unified medium.
1.

COST-SHIFTING

The discussion in part UI.A.2 supra suggested that the government
might argue that a labeling requirement is a permissible underinclusive
regulation because the government could have banned unsolicited
commercial solicitations altogether. This subsection analyzes the validity
of that claim. The government's interest in preventing unfair shifting of
advertising costs from sender to receiver has been found to be sufficiently
strong to justify a complete205ban on a mode of communication, such as
While the reasoning behind this principle
unsolicited fax advertising.
remains somewhat elusive,20 6 this rationale apparently obtains either
when unsolicited commercial solicitations impose unavoidable and
objectively measurable costs on the recipient or when the sender shifts
costs that he otherwise would bear from himself to the recipient.
Whether this rationale would support a complete ban on unsolicited
advertisements in a unified medium depends on how participation in the
medium is financed. If most users incur time-based charges for online
usage, then a fairly direct analogy to the fax context can be drawn: just
as unsolicited faxes impose the unavoidable and objectively measurable
costs of paper and ink on the recipient, so too do unsolicited electronic
advertisements impose the unavoidable and objectively measurable costs
of the online time required to download and delete the solicitations. If
participation is free or financed through fixed monthly charges, then the
analogy begins to evaporate. Under such a scheme the costs imposed by
unsolicited advertisements would be the inconvenience of sorting through
the junk. This inconvenience is analogous to the "short, though regular,
journey from mail box to trash can" that the Court considered a
20 7
reasonable cost for consumers to bear.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,75 (1993).
See Project 80's, Inc. v. City of Pocatello, 942 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1991).
See Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56 (9th Cir. 1995).
See supra part III.A.2.
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72.
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In the fax context, however, a complete ban is also justified by the
interest in avoiding the added harm of message preclusion. This interest
would not be present in the unified medium.20 8 Whether this added
element is necessary to justify a complete ban probably depends on the
alternatives available to both parties. On the one hand the government
could make the costs of electronic advertisements avoidable by enacting a
labeling requirement, which would allow for effective filtering. On the
other hand, advertisers would still have an electronic means of
communicating with potential customers through their Web page, and
advertisers would have the alternative channels of regular mail (assuming
it still exists) and the voice component of the medium (the telephone
equivalent), as well as door-to-door sales.
Given the wealth of alternatives for advertisers and the fact that the
government does not have to choose the least restrictive means available,
a complete ban on electronic advertisements would likely withstand
intermediate scrutiny if electronic advertisements imposed unavoidable
and objectively measurable costs on recipients, even though the messagepreclusion problem is absent. If the medium were financed other than by
charges for online time, the government interest in preventing the
inconvenience of sorting through the junk would probably be insufficient
to justify a complete ban. However, the government may be able to use
an alternative rationale to reach the same result.
2.

PROTECTING PRIVACY: A COMPLETE BAN AS A
REASONABLE TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER
RESTRICTION

If the government cannot support a ban on unsolicited electronic
advertisements with a cost-shifting rationale, it may try to do so as a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction analogous to the complete
prohibition on solicitations made by automatic dialing machines.20 9 The
analogy would be that the government has not banned all electronic
solicitations because consumers still can receive these when they search
for goods and services on the Web (or its future equivalent). The
government has only banned those unsolicited electronic advertisements
sent from advertisers to consumers. This is viewpoint-neutral because it
bans solicitations from all advertisers, and advertisers still have available
abundant alternatives, such as telephone solicitations, door-to-door
solicitations, and mass-media advertising (which now would not be as
distinct from direct marketing).2 10
208.
Internet
209.
210.

See supra part II.A. (explaining why message preclusion is not a problem in the
context).
See Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1995).
See supra part I.B.
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As discussed above, the government could constitutionally ban all
unsolicited electronic advertisements if such a ban prevented the
imposition of unavoidable and objectively measurable costs on recipients.
Because the costs would be unavoidable, a government ban in effect
would not be supplanting any private choice. Although a ban would
burden commercial speakers and those willing recipients of unsolicited
electronic advertisements, the burden would be permissible because it
would avoid unfair cost-shifting while leaving open ample alternative
channels to advertisers.
If electronic advertisements do not impose unavoidable costs on
recipients, a closer question arises if the government attempts to ban all
such advertisements. The government may attempt to justify such a ban
as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. The precedents
support both sides. Those challenging such a ban could point to attempts
at similar bans on door-to-door solicitations, which have been
invalidated as overinclusive.2 1' The argument would be that just as a ban
on door-to-door sales is overinclusive because it entirely forecloses a
valuable avenue of communication for commercial speakers, so too would
a ban on unsolicited electronic advertising be overinclusive because it
shuts off the primary means of communication with potential customers.
The government could respond that a ban on electronic advertising is no
different than a ban on automated telephone calls. Just as the ban on
auto-dialers reasonably protected privacy while leaving open the avenue
of "live" telephone solicitation, so too would a ban on unsolicited
electronic advertising protect privacy while leaving open the avenue of
electronic advertising through the Web, telephone or door-to-door
solicitation, or mass-media advertising. The issue is too close to predict
an outcome without further experience.
D.

Summary

Three of the likely types of regulation the government may consider
for unsolicited direct advertising in a unified medium are a labeling
requirement for junk communications, restrictions on the sale of personal
information, and a complete ban on electronic solicitations. A labeling
requirement would appear to be constitutionally permissible as an
enabling regulation that allows us to avoid the tragedy of the commons
while leaving the decision over which communications to receive in
private hands. A restriction on the sale of personal information would be
a matter more of privacy law and property law than a matter of free
speech. However, were the restriction to place a material obstacle
between commercial speakers and their intended audience, a court would

211. See supra part I.A.
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potentially analyze whether such a restriction is a reasonable time, place,
and manner restriction on speech. Whether the government could
completely ban unsolicited commercial solicitations in the unified medium
would depend on the specific facts. If such a ban were to prevent
unavoidable shifting of advertising costs, the ban probably would be
upheld; but if the ban were simply to protect privacy, the issue would be
close and its resolution would depend on the precise situation at the time.
CONCLUSION
Rapid developments in digital technology present exciting new
possibilities for communications. More information and new kinds of
information increasingly are available to greater numbers of people
around the world. The growth of electronic mail as a common means of
communication may serve as a much-needed spur to improve literacy in
America and beyond. The medium may well improve the operation of
representative democracy by allowing the electorate to be better informed
and representatives to be more accountable.
All of the benefits and the marvels offered by the emerging media,
however, may be unobtainable if we allow ourselves to be buried in a
The incentives for advertisers to
blizzard of electronic clutter.
communicate early and often are great, and relying on self-restraint by
advertisers to avoid a tragedy of the commons in the unified medium
would not be reasonable. Already the phenomenon of electronic junk
As more potential
mail-spam-is growing fast on the Internet.
customers get wired, online advertisers will likely step up their efforts.
The market is responding with sophisticated information filters, but
the government will have to provide an enabling regulatory structure for
the filters to be effective. Should the government decide as a matter of
sound public policy to ban all unsolicited commercial solicitations in the
unified medium, it may be possible to do so under certain circumstances.
V.

